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 This thesis seeks to prove that Seleukos IV Philopator was a competent ruler after the death 
of his father and throughout his peaceful 12 year reign. Seleukos was a king who led a successful 
reign and led the Seleukid Empire through a challenging time of recovery and rebuilding, 
undeserving of any neglect or negative reputation he receives in both the primary and secondary 
source material. Although there are few pieces of information which directly address Seleukos, 
what does remain in the literary, numismatic, and epigraphic evidence supports that he was an 
active and prudent ruler. Contrary to the inactivity and weakness he is accused of, Seleukos did 
not follow the treaty of Apameia, he was able to manage the internal affairs of his kingdom, and 
he developed a robust foreign policy to take part in international politics. Although he is often seen 
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Chapter I: Introduction 
“The reference is to the Seleukos surnamed Philopator, the son of Antiochos 
the Great, who performed no deeds worthy of Syria or of his father in his reign, but 
perished ingloriously without fighting a single battle.”  
“[Seleukos] fait un peu pâle figure entre son père Antiochos III et son frère 
cadet Antiochos IV” 
Above, St. Jerome and Édouard Will respectively serve to demonstrate the essence of 
general opinions on the Seleukid monarch Seleukos IV Philopator.1 Indeed the reputation of 
Seleukos is less notable in comparison to his namesake founder of the Seleukid kingdom, his own 
famous father, and even his infamous younger brother; however, unlike these other three Seleukid 
kings, much less about Seleukos has been transmitted to modern scholars concerning his life and 
reign. This in turn leaves modern scholarship largely at the mercy of ancient historians who, feeling 
that his reign was less than ideal for a Hellenistic ruler or writing from the perspective of Roman 
influence, wrote with little to no interest in Seleukos. These factors were further exacerbated by 
those grandiose reigns which bookended his own. The primary source depictions (or lack thereof) 
will be discussed below. The questions which remain are as follows: what was happening under 
the reign of Seleukos IV and is the opinion that he was a lazy and unsuccessful ruler justified? Can 
a ruler who reigned alone for twelve straight years, from 187-175 BCE, with no major conflict or 
highlighted problems be considered a failure? 2 
 Although his reign was perhaps not the most obviously active, negative opinions have 
unfairly been applied to Seleukos. Certainly it is true that he was not responsible for any great 
                                                          
1 Jerome In Danielem 11.20, in reference to the quote "And there shall stand up in his place one most vile and 
unworthy of kingly honor, and in a few days he shall be destroyed, not in rage nor in a battle.", and Will 1982, 254. 
Unless stated otherwise, “Seleukos” will refer to Seleukos IV. 




expansion of the Seleukid Empire, nor was he particularly known for any great battles, but his 
positive qualities are often overlooked by ancient and modern historians alike. Seleukos IV 
Philopator was not the inactive and lazy king which he is often portrayed to be; although 
challenged by the circumstances in which he was ruling after the battle of Magnesia and the 
subsequent treaty of Apameia, he successfully governed the Seleukid Empire through the resulting 
hardships and maintained his political positioning by rebuilding foreign relationships and 
rehabilitating a defeated kingdom. Limited as he was in some aspects of his ability to act as a king, 
he was able to hold together his inheritance through deft governing of a reduced kingdom and 
maintaining peace so that an important period of recovery was able to take place. One wonders 
whether Seleukos understood the challenges under which he would be forced to command his 
kingdom, and whether or not he thought that he was a successful paradigm of a Seleukid, or even 
a Hellenistic, king.  
 This thesis will examine the life and reign of Seleukos in several areas key to understanding 
his time as king. It will begin with an overview of the Seleukid war against Rome and her allies, 
Antiochos III Megas’ campaign to reclaim Seleukos I’s vast empire, and the entrance of Seleukos 
IV into some prominence during that conflict. This conflict leads directly to the treaty of Apameia, 
where the conditions and the effects of the treaty will be discussed, followed by whether or not the 
treaty itself was legally valid for Seleukos’ reign. It will then move to discussion of internal affairs 
of the Seleukid Empire at the time, the aspects of Seleukos’ rule which happened within his 
domain, such as the kingdom’s economy and his religious considerations. Next, the external affairs 
of the kingdom will be presented, especially focused on foreign policy and relations, with a 
discussion of Seleukos’ lack of military action. The final thing to be examined will be the death of 




 As already mentioned, Seleukos himself is largely a neglected figure in most ancient and 
modern scholarship; very little information is written on him in the remaining primary sources 
(both literary, epigraphic, and numismatic) which in turn creates difficulties in the modern study 
of him. Perhaps the paucity of primary sources led to modern scholars judging Seleukos similarly 
to the ancient ones as being unimportant, perhaps because after the reign of Antiochos III the next 
major events in the Seleukid kingdom happen under Antiochos IV. This perhaps made Seleukos 
that much easier to overlook and less interesting for directed attention. The primary sources on 
Seleukos are generally negative due to the fact that he did not fit an aggressive kingly persona. 
Furthermore, because many of the sources were directed to studies of things other than Seleukos, 
he appears primarily only in minor ways. This point is also relevant for modern scholarship. 
 Among the primary historical sources, Seleukos held a firm reputation for excessive 
caution, weakness, and inactivity.3 This is certainly displayed in the quote of Jerome above, who 
directly calls him an unworthy heir. Jerome’s own view of the Seleukids was very much influenced 
by the Bible which he is analyzing, and therefore by its Jewish viewpoint which was not always 
positive towards their Hellenistic rulers and certainly was affected negatively during the late reign 
of Seleukos and under his successor.4 It is also worth mentioning that Jerome is a fairly late source 
for this period, writing in the late 4th century CE. Similarly to Jerome, the books of Maccabees (I 
and II, both composed in the late second century BCE) provide some information about Seleukos 
and the Seleukids, though this information is of course biased especially considering the Jewish 
Revolt and the leader for which the books are named.5 Polybios is one of the closest contemporary 
                                                          
3 Gruen 1984, 644. 
4 Some discussion of the Jewish people and the rule of Antiochos III, Seleukos IV, and Antiochos IV can be found 
below. 
5 I Macc was probably written between 135-104, in Hebrew or Aramaic. II Macc has a more complex origin, 
originally written in 5 books by Jason of Cyrene, which was subsequently epitomized, and then again edited with 




literary sources to address Seleukos, writing in the same century in which Seleukos lived. 
However, if any direct comment on the character or ability of Seleukos was made in Polybios, it 
does not survive in what has been transmitted of his work until today. The same is true of Livy, 
who used Polybios as a source for his own historical writings, though both he and Polybios mention 
Seleukos largely as an agent in the events of others rather than treating him as a lead player or 
commenting as other ancient authors do. Justin, who writes moralizing history through epitomizing 
Trogus, moves right past Seleukos IV’s entire reign, jumping from the death of Antiochos III to 
Antiochos IV’s invasion of Egypt two books later.6 Given the lack of exciting events in Seleukid 
Asia during this time it is not entirely surprising that Justin does this. Finally, Appian claims that 
Seleukos was feeble in his reign and had no success because of his father’s misfortune.7 
Interestingly, he does not entirely blame Seleukos himself as a cause for the creation of the 
negative opinions, but rather the circumstances of his rule, more similarly to the opinions of 
modern scholars discussed below. Appian also writes a more compressed version of events 
compared to Polybios and Livy. 
 Why might the ancient authors have viewed Seleukos in this way? Many were writing from 
a Roman or pro-Roman viewpoint, for one. Errington also attributes this view to being formed as 
a result of the kingdom having to pay an indemnity to Rome, and indemnity which “hindered 
virtually every political initiative that might have interested contemporary historians”; this in turn 
led to the characterization of Seleukos as weak and lacking in initiative.8 It may be partially true 
that the indemnity caused some trouble, however it is not entirely clear that the indemnity was 
                                                          
6 Just. 32.2 and 34.2 respectively. Justin also fails to mention even Perseus’ wedding to Seleukos’ daughter Laodike. 
The Prologi  of Trogus (XXXII) mentions the death of Seleukos and his replacement by Antiochos (IV), which Justin 
also does not include in his narrative: “Mortuo Seleuco filio Magni Antiochi successit regno frater Antiochus.” 
7 App. Syr. 66; See Appendix B1 for Appian and Josephus text. 




crippling to any plans which Seleukos may have had. Certainly kings were expected to be wealthy, 
a poor king was a contradiction in terms. The power of the Ptolemies is often related to money and 
income, and the same applied to Seleukos’ successor Antiochos IV when he paraded his wealth 
and power at Daphne in 166. Wealth enabled kings to employ troops and acquire booty; it also 
allowed them acquire and control territory, which in turn financed military power.9  
Furthermore, perhaps more importantly, kings were associated very much with strength; 
as was the case with wealth, a weak king was a contradiction. In their addresses to their armies at 
Raphia in 217, both Antiochos III and Ptolemy VI, since neither had yet won a major victory due 
to their recent ascension to kingship, were forced to refer to their ancestors’ victories to motivate 
their troops.10 Hellenistic kings were expected to take personal command of major military 
campaigns and lead the royal forces. As a result, royal status often derived from first instances of 
military success instead of solely through descent or wealth, especially in the Seleukid dynasty 
where “the chief business is assumed to be war.”11 Polybios directly points to the fact that courage 
and ability in war are two hallmarks of a successful king and later gives examples of the courage 
of Antiochos III.12 There is also an inscription extant which praises Antiochos I for being “avid 
for battle”, again consistent with this assumed role of Hellenistic kings.13 All of the major growth 
or contractions of the Seleukid Empire were related to military events, and since Seleukos had no 
                                                          
9 Austin 1986, 459-60. 
10 Ibid; Polyb. 5.83. 
11 Austin 2005, 125; Eckstein 2006, 82-3, 88; Antiochos III’s anabasis campaign was what made him worthy of 
royalty, not only to those in Asia but those in Europe as well. 
12 Polyb. 4.77.3; Antiochos’ courage in Polyb. 11.34.14-16; Ptolemy IV wanted peace so Polybios shows him some 
contempt in 5.87.3, although he had shown his willingness to fight already at Polyb. 5.85, and even Antiochos 
became an object of criticism for Polybios when he seemed to back down from larger ambitions at Polyb. 15.37, cf. 
App. Syr. 28; see Eckstein 2006, 88. 
13 Austin 2006 159 = OGIS 219, an inscription dedicated by Ilium in honour of his ascension, which may rather have 




major military actions during his reign he was then relegated to a lesser status.14 Bad kings were 
seen as immobile, lazy, prisoners of the palace, and because Seleukos appeared to fit this mold it 
formed his poor reputation, a reputation which was not unlike that which was given to Demetrios 
I, Alexander I Balas, or Antiochos IX Cyzicenus.15 Seleukos’ reputation is further hurt by the fact 
that only he and Antiochos II were Seleukid kings who died in their palaces, adding to the image 
of an inactive king not leaving his home.16 
Modern scholars, on the other hand, are largely divided on the opinion of Appian, 
acknowledging that he may not have been a brilliant king but he would have been unable to act 
any way other than he did.17 It seems that the majority of modern scholars hold a somewhat 
middling view of the contribution of Seleukos to the Seleukid Empire. Few outright proclaim him 
as a poor king but few give him very much attention or speak highly of him, which is not 
unexpected considering the scarcity of primary sources. Modern views may be divided into four 
categories: those who neglect Seleukos, those who are entirely negative about him, the majority 
who are ambivalent, and the minority who take a rather positive view. From authors who neglected 
Seleukos whenever he is mentioned it is primarily to discuss another historical character in 
relation, as is the case in Grainger (2017) and Walbank (1993), in whose works Seleukos is very 
seldom mentioned, or Bar-Kochva (1976), where Seleukos is not mentioned at all.  The second 
category contains those authors who are entirely negative towards Seleukos; a good example of 
                                                          
14 Examples: Ipsos in 301, and then Koroupedion in 282 for gain of Asia Minor by Seleukos I. Antiochos III’s victory 
at Panion for gain of Koile Syria and Phoenicia, or his defeat at Magnesia for losing Asia Minor. The defeat of 
Antiochos VII in 130-29 for loss of the east. See Austin 2005, 125; Walbank 1993, 124. 
15 Kosmin 2014, 176. 
16 Kosmin 2014, 144. 




this is Hölbl in writing his history of the Ptolemaic dynasty when he says that Antiochos III was 
“succeeded by a weak king”.18  
The largest category of modern scholars addressed here are those who believe that Seleukos 
was an average king dealing with difficult circumstances. These authors often adduce competency 
as a military commander in the field; generally they look to the period of conflict with the Romans 
before his time as king, given the lack of evidence for conflict during his own reign.19 Gruen points 
to the fact that Seleukos was ruling in difficult circumstances although he still wished to rule as 
did his forebears.20 Another opinion very common among scholars is that it was appropriate for 
Seleukos to have been content with curbing any personal ambitions and presiding over the 
necessary recovery of the kingdom after the devastation of defeat by the Romans. Thus his reign 
represented a strange period of peace for the Seleukids.21 His focus on rebuilding and paying the 
indemnity and the resulting restraint led to Seleukos’ ill-gotten reputation as a weak ruler, gaining 
for himself little prominence, and leaving little mark on history.22 Still, many of these authors put 
a proportionately greater weight on what evidence remains since there is so little of it. These 
authors present a more robust image, pieced together from consolidating a variety of sources, 
which is often less a feeble and idle one than the commonly depicted Seleukos.23 The final 
category, those with an entirely positive opinion of Seleukos’ reign, is almost solely represented 
by Rostovtzeff, who claims that the spectacular revival of the Seleukids under Antiochos III 
                                                          
18 Hölbl 2001, 141. 
19 Mørkholm 1966, 32; Grainger 1997, 64; Bevan 1966, 120. 
20 Gruen 1984, 644; Mørkholm 1966, 32. 
21 Gera 1998, 109; Bevan 1966, 120; Mørkholm 1966, 32; Tarn and Griffith 1952, 29; Aperghis 2004, 25; Houghton 
and Lorber 2008, 1; Welles 1974, 45. 
22 Kosmin 2014, 21; Bevan 1966, 120; Gruen 1984, 644; Seleukos eventually abandoned paying the indemnity, see 
further discussion below. 




“continued, despite Roman victory against Antiochos, under his successors Seleukos IV and 
Antiochos IV.”24  
One can see from the opinions in both the primary and secondary literature that there is 
hardly a unanimous opinion of what value Seleukos brought to the dynasty. It will be argued that 
Seleukos was a competent and prudent king, and he carried forward the work of Antiochos III. In 
order to understand the reign of Seleukos, and the circumstances under which his reign was 
constrained, one must begin with the final years of Antiochos III Megas. 
  
                                                          




Chapter II: Antiochos III and the Future Seleukos IV: Before 187 
 It is challenging to place Seleukos’ birthdate precisely. Grainger believes that Antiochos 
III’s earliest child was not born before 220/119, a son who would be Antiochos (sometimes given 
the epithet “Neos” and also known as Antiochos the Son). Mørkholm places Seleukos’ birth 
sometime after that between 219 and 215.25 He was the son of Laodike, who was a daughter of 
Mithridates II of Pontus and was married to his father Antiochos III in 221, shortly after his 
succession to the Seleukid throne in 223.26 Seleukos had at least five siblings: two brothers, the 
aforementioned Antiochos the Son and his younger brother Antiochos (later IV), and three sisters, 
Kleopatra, Antiochis, and Laodike, who was also his wife.27 His primarily used epithet is 
Philopator, presumably for acknowledgement of his father’s illustrious reign, however Josephus 
gives an alternate epithet for Seleukos as “Soter”.28 
 Antiochos III Megas is known today for his aggressive expansion of the Seleukid kingdom, 
which, through attempting to reestablish the size it had reached at the end of Seleukos I’s rule, 
eventually brought him into direct conflict with the Romans. Antiochos unleashed the Fifth Syrian 
War in 202 in Koile Syria and Phoenicia when he swept through that area in 202/1 and crushed 
the Ptolemaic forces in 200/199 at the battle of Panion, near the headwaters of the Jordan River.29 
Rome advised him not to invade Egypt and instead he spent 198 subjugating Koile Syria and 
Phoenicia at his leisure.30 Rome’s relations with the east had intensified significantly after the 
Second Punic War when they were able to direct a larger amount of their efforts there. This resulted 
                                                          
25 Grainger 2017, 112; Mørkholm 1966, 32. 
26 Kosmin 2014, 136; for more information of the lineage of Seleukos, see appendix A. 
27 Grainger 1997, 63; this list may not be exhaustive. More on Laodike as Seleukos’ wife below. 
28 Josephus AJ 12.223; this is perhaps a conflation with Seleukos III Soter (Keraunos) or even Demetrios I Soter, as 
Seleukos IV is not called this anywhere else. This must also be the correct Seleukos, since he is both referenced as 
being the son of Antiochos Megas at 12.223 and the brother of Antiochos Epiphanes at 12.234. 
29 Grainger 2010, 255-61. 
30 Green 1990, 304; Eckstein 2006, 112, 292; Gera 1998, 79; Aperghis 2004, 25. The Fifth Syrian war concluded in 




in stronger connections with both the Seleukid and the Ptolemaic kingdoms through increased 
Roman involvement in Greece and Macedonia after 200.31 
 In order to understand the context for Seleukos’ rule, it is first important to know of 
Antiochos III’s war against Rome during the 190s. During the spring of 197 Antiochos embarked 
on an expedition to restore Seleukid rule to Asia Minor. He was successful in regaining influence 
in many regions, including taking land from Philip V and Ptolemy V while also applying pressure 
to the independent Greek cities along the Ionian coast.32 At the same time a land army commanded 
by two of his sons and two generals, Ardys and Mithridates, set out towards Asia Minor to assist 
in this campaign.33 In 196, both Eumenes II of Pergamon and Antiochos sent envoys to T. 
Quinctius Flamininus at Corinth, seeking to gain sympathy from a then uncommitted Rome.34 He 
crossed the Hellespont in 196 and seized several cities along the way, including an abandoned 
Lysimacheia.35 Rome came to mediate between Antiochos and Ptolemy, and ordered him to 
evacuate all that he had taken from Philip and Ptolemy.36 Rome initially avoided making and direct 
interference into the affair since Antiochos was an acknowledged amicus of the Roman republic, 
but eventually the idea of a Seleukid king in Europe worried the senate and pushed the Romans to 
action.37  
                                                          
31 Gera 1998, 50. 
32 Livy 33.19.8-11; Gera 1998, 73; Ma 2000, 87; Grainger 2002, 83-4; Hansen 1971, 74; he was notably unable to 
capture either Smyrna or Lampsakos, who appealed to Rome while he wintered in Ephesos, see Hansen 1971. 
33 Livy 33.19; Antiochos had no son named Ardys, so these two names could constitute both of the generals or it 
could be one general and Antiochos IV, sometimes named Mithridates; it seems more likely that it is the two 
generals since in Polybios since he calls Antiochos IV “Antiochos the youngest son” at 16.18.6 and again at 
16.19.10 where he is in charge of some cavalry. It may have been Seleukos (IV) and Antiochos (IV) with that army, 
their youth explaining the need for generals, see Ma 2000, 87. 
34 Hansen 1971, 75. 
35 Livy 33.38.8-14; Polyb. 18.49.2; App. Syr. 1; Hansen 1971, 75; Gera 1998, 76-66; Green 1990, 304. 
36 Ibid.; Gera 1998, 74; Grainger 2010, 274. 
37 Livy 32.8.13 and 16, 32.27.1; Gruen 2014, 285; Gera 1998, 75; Burton 2011, 105-6; the origin of Roman amicitia 




At the aforementioned meeting with Rome, which was either in 196 or 195, in addition to 
demanding he return land the Romans also issued a demand that he not to cross the Hellespont 
with an army; Antiochos refused to comply, claimed that he had no intention of attacking Rome 
and did not interfere in Italy, and was questioning why the Romans thought they had a right to 
interfere in his ancestral claim to Thrace as spear won land taken by Seleukos I at the battle of 
Koroupedion.38 Antiochos also announced to the Romans that he was just about to conclude a 
treaty of friendship with his adversary Ptolemy, though how far along this process was at the time 
is unclear.39  
Seleukos was a prominent figure in this campaign, both as a commander and as a 
representative of his father’s rule while governing Thrace. Furthermore, with Seleukos’ army 
Antiochos was able to assert substantial control over Asia Minor before Magnesia.40  He first 
appears as the motivation for Antiochos’ decision to rebuild Lysimacheia: Antiochos was setting 
it up as a European capital for Seleukos to rule over, after he hunted down the barbarians who had 
pillaged it and retrieved its citizens.41 Grainger identifies the restoration of Lysimacheia as perhaps 
the opening action leading into the restoration of Lysimachos’ kingdom, which certainly aligns 
with Antiochos’ claims to be interested in ancestral spear-won lands.42 Antiochos spent some time 
rebuilding and recuperating Lysimacheia, and after 195 he left Seleukos in charge of the city as he 
quietly went southward after hearing false rumors about the death of Ptolemy V. The 
                                                          
38 Polyb. 18.49-52; Livy 33.29.1-43.3; App. Syr. 3; Will 1982, 159; Green 1990, 304; Gera 1998, 77, 82; Grainger 
2002, 84; Bevan 1966, 51; Austin 2006 196. 
39 Hölbl 2001, 140. 
40 Ma 2000, 93, who specifies ‘cis-Tauric’ Asia Minor. 
41 Polyb. 18.51.7; Livy 33.40; Capdetrey 2007, 214, 370; Grainger 2002, 95, 100; he was probably to be left at 
Lysimacheia with professional administrators to help him, as he was around 20 years old at this time. 




reestablishment of Lysimacheia constitutes the beginning what Will refers to as “guerre froide” 
between the Seleukids and the Romans at Lysimacheia.43  
An important event which happened during this time was the death of Seleukos’ older 
brother Antiochos the Son during the summer of 193 by poisoning, who was until then the co-
ruler, in Syria before his journey eastwards to govern the upper satrapies.44 This left Seleukos to 
the elevation of co-rule of the kingdom with his father. Seleukos’ brother Antiochos the Son was 
born around 220, first appears in the records during Antiochos’ eastern campaign, and fought at 
Panion; he became co-regent with his father in 210 and married his sister Laodike IV.45  Antiochos 
learned of the death of his first born son during a meeting with P. Villius Tappulus.46 With 
Antiochos the Son gone, it is not unreasonable to think that Seleukos’ role under his father during 
the war against the Romans was the result of extra responsibilities and duties to fill the position 
his brother had previously occupied. 
Antiochos crossed the Aegean to be commander-in-chief of the Aetolian League on their 
offer of the position.47 However, this expedition to Greece would end in massive failure for 
Antiochos. He was defeated at Thermopylae in 191 by Roman forces and was forced to retreat 
back to Asia Minor, before the final battle at Magnesia.48 It is from Seleukos’ actions below during 
the war with Rome that one is able to see that Seleukos had the ability to be a successful military 
commander and was also deemed capable by his father to govern.49 
                                                          
43 App. Syr. 4; Will 1982, 160; Eckstein 2006, 292. 
44 Livy 35.15, which also reports that Antiochos himself had his son murdered, though this seems unlikely. A 
Babylonian king list gives his death in 119 SE = 193, Sachs and Wiseman 1954 (Babylonian King List), 208; Will 1982, 
167; Taylor 2013, 109; Grainger 1997, 63-4; Grainger 2002, 157; Ma 2000, 93. 
45 App. Syr. 4; Polybios 18.8; Bar-Kochva 1976, 151; Mørkholm 1966, 38; Houghton and Lorber 2008, 1; Sachs and 
Wiseman 1954, 207; Ma 2000, 93. 
46 Livy 35.15.2. 
47 App. Syr. 12; Hansen 1971, 77. 
48 Livy 36.15-32; App. Syr. 17-20; Diod. 22.3; Briscoe 1981, 241-251; Hansen 1971, 78. 
49 It is possible that Seleukos only had a nominal leadership role in this campaign, and that the effective command 




 In 191/0, presumably after the defeat at Thermopylae, Antiochos recalled Seleukos from 
Lysimacheia and stationed him in Aeolis at the head of an armed force, threatening Phokaia, the 
naval base of Elaia, and the Roman base at Kanai. Although Eumenes and the Romans raided 
around him, he did not move his army.50 From this position Seleukos was able to successfully 
reverse the political situation in Phokaia where the population was divided into two factions: the 
oligarchs who wanted to support Rome, and the democrats who wanted to support the Seleukids.51 
By reversing the situation at Phokaia he showed that he possessed some measure of political 
acumen. The direct presence of Seleukos undoubtedly helped his cause. When a delegation of pro-
Romans and pro-Seleukids came to meet with him, Seleukos simply moved his army closer and 
eventually swayed the city to his side; this in turn brought other cities to the Seleukids, such as 
Syme.52 Seleukos kept the army with him through the winter in Aeolis, attempted to take the harbor 
at Elaia, and began to ravage the countryside around Pergamon. Eventually Antiochos joined him 
from Apameia with Galatian mercenaries; they were able to successfully hurt Eumenes’ food 
supplies. An attempted peace negotiation at Elaia failed.53 
They then further attacked Elaia and Pergamon itself, blockading the former, though they 
were careful not to trap themselves in a costly and time-consuming siege.54 In 190 the Romans 
again met with Antiochos, but he again rejected their terms and Seleukos continued the blockade 
while Antiochos marched north to secure control of the Hellespont.55 Seleukos continued 
plundering, but was forced to retreat from his attacks on Pergamon and withdrew entirely from 
                                                          
50 Livy 37.8.5-7; Hansen 1971, 80; Bevan 1966, 94-5; Briscoe 1981, 303-4; Grainger 2002, 268: this force was 
probably fairly small, but sufficient to maintain Seleukid presence along the coastlands around Phokaia and 
maintain pressure on the cities there, though likely not more than that. 
51 Livy 37.8-9. 
52 Livy 37.9.1-4; Polyb. 21.6; Briscoe 1981, 304; Grainger 2002, 268; Bevan 1966, 96; Walbank 1979, 170: Phokaia 
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Attalid territory; he was blocked from the city by a corps of Achaians, under a certain strategos 
Diophanes, which had arrived to help the Attalids, though the exact extent of their success is likely 
to have been somewhat exaggerated by the patriotic Polybios.56 Despite the Seleukid efforts, the 
Romans had been able to come to Asia Minor to confront them. Antiochos tried to stop the Romans 
by offering to give up his claim to European cities, any friends of Rome, and also to pay for half 
of the Roman war expenditure, but the Scipios rejected his offer and pushed on to Magnesia.57 
 The war between the Romans and the Seleukids came to an end at Magnesia-on-Sipylos in 
late 190 or early 189.58 Antiochos in kingly fashion commanded the right wing of the Seleukid 
battle line himself, while Seleukos, acting as a second-in-command for his father, and his cousin 
Antipatros commanded the left wing comprised of mixed troops directly opposite Eumenes and 
his Achaian allies.59 Antiochos ordered Seleukos to begin the battle, since the Seleukid left wing 
greatly outflanked the right of the Roman alliance, but Eumenes was familiar with Asian fighting 
techniques and was able to take advantage of confusion in the attack. Opposing missile fire 
scattered Seleukos’ camels, which in turn threw the cavalry arrangements into disarray. The 
chariots were unable to create a charge, they became vulnerable to flanking maneuvers, and 
Eumenes was able to break the line. While Antiochos had success on the right he did not wheel 
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back and support the left, recreating the same mistake which had cost him the battle at Raphia in 
217.60  
It is difficult to disagree with Will’s analysis that it was a definitive disaster for Antiochos, 
who was “put to flight like Darius III” to Sardeis as he collected others; upon arriving at Sardeis 
he learned that Seleukos had survived and was on the way to Apameia likely together with high 
ranking courtiers.61 The Romans did capture Antipatros and Zeuxis, one of the commanders of the 
center of the Seleukid line, and re-issued their initial conditions for truce which included: the 
renunciation of Antiochos’ claim on Thrace, the evacuation of Asia Minor from the line of the 
Taurus Mountains, a 15000 talent indemnity, 20 hostages, and the surrender of several important 
people including Hannibal, who had been advising Antiochos throughout the war.62 Antiochos 
retreated back behind friendly borders into Syria, while he left Seleukos behind in charge of Asia 
with an army of unknown size, although it was likely not negligible. The fact that Seleukos was 
left behind there may suggest that Antiochos planned to gather more troops over the course of 189 
if the Romans continued to insist on their stringent terms.63 In spite of Antiochos’ possible hopes, 
the Seleukids were forced in the end to accept the Roman terms; this victory ended the 
‘Antiochene’ war for the Romans and made them the supreme arbiters of Asia Minor.64 
One of the conditions of the truce was that Antiochos would supply Gn. Manlius Vulso 
with grain and supplies for a campaign that he was about to undertake against the Galatian tribes 
in Asia Minor, the delivery of which Antiochos assigned to Seleukos. He brought the grain to 
Antiocheia-on-Menander where the Romans were camped and delivered them to Vulso but refused 
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to give any to the Pergamene troops there, citing that his father had agreed “to help only the 
Romans.” Vulso insisted that Seleukos supply the Pergamenes as well, and forbade any Roman 
from taking from the grain until the Pergamenes had gotten a share.65 Even this early on one can 
see the hostility which Seleukos continued to hold against Pergamon, and Rome as well, which 
will become a large part of his foreign policy later in life. The grain transfer very likely depleted 
the stores which Seleukos had at Apameia, preventing him from keeping a large army nearby.66 
Seleukos also provided guides to the Romans for their expedition to the interior of Asia Minor.67 
Livy suggests that Seleukos, the middle son, was given control of Lysimacheia in 196 in 
order to elevate him above his elder brother Antiochos the Son, but Taylor asserts that this is to be 
better understood as a grant to the son who was not intended to become king.68 After the defeat at 
Magnesia, one of Antiochos’ very first priorities was to consolidate the dynasty, and his eldest 
surviving son, Seleukos, became co-regent with him at least by 189.69  Assessing a date for the 
beginning of Antiochos and Seleukos’ co-rule is challenging because of the lack of evidence from 
Babylonian primary sources, and as such scholars are split on whether he was elevated soon after 
Antiochos the Son’s death (in 193) or later, in 189.70 Grainger argues that Seleukos became co-
regent in 192 after the death of his brother, however he provides no conclusive evidence that 
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Seleukos was elevated to kingship at that time.71 Other scholars, such as Habicht, believe that 
Seleukos was not made co-regent until 189.72 If the latter is true, then there was a noticeable gap 
between the death of Antiochos the Son and Seleukos’ ascension in which Antiochos rules alone; 
perhaps Antiochos was too occupied with the war or too far from Seleukos to formally name him 
co-regent.73 It could be suggested that it was not until after defeat at Magnesia that Antiochos made 
the decision to promote his second son, and that he deliberately waited until after the terms of the 
treaty of Apameia were set in order that Seleukos would not be named in, and therefore bound by, 
the treaty. 
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Chapter III: The Treaty of Apameia, Death of Antiochos III, and Succession of Seleukos 
 The treaty of Apameia changed the Hellenistic east, where Rome became the predominant 
power. The naval disarmament clause made the Romans a dominant naval power in the east 
through their Pergamene and Rhodian allies, and the time which followed was one of frequent 
Roman interference.74 By contrast Seleukid power was somewhat reduced, and restricted to the 
eastern Mediterranean and Iran.75 Initially the problems created by Apameia were Antiochos’, 
however following his death they fell to his successor Seleukos. Will writes that Seleukos was 
paralyzed by the consequences of his father’s defeat but still did not resign.76 Seleukos certainly 
had a number of problems stemming from the Seleukid defeat by Rome, but he was not entirely 
as paralyzed as Will suggests.  
 The treaty of Apameia, which is reported in Polybios, Livy, and Appian,77 enshrined the 
demands originally made by P. Scipio on behalf of his brother immediately after Antiochos’ defeat 
at Magnesia, ratified first by the Roman senate then a second time at Apameia in 189/8.78 It is 
known that the Romans engraved the treaty on bronze tablets and placed them in their capital.79 
The treaty was carefully designed to weaken the Seleukid Empire so that Roman interests would 
not be jeopardized in the future, and equally importantly to punish Antiochos for not complying 
with the initial Roman demands during the previous years.80 However, while Antiochos was left 
sovereign and not a vassal to Rome, the conflict left the Seleukid devoid of any western ambitions 
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for the time being. Cut from the Aegean world, the empire became more strictly Asian than ever 
before.81 The rearrangement of Asia Minor favoured Pergamon and Rhodes; even if they did not 
become ‘clients’ of the Roman state in the sense that Badian once argued, the relationship with 
Rome was definitely one of benefaction and obligation at least as far as the Romans would have 
been concerned.82 This also meant that Roman patrocinium passed the Aegean and extended all 
the way to the Taurus Mountains.83  
The effects of the treaty were felt immediately in Syria, and while the terms were hard they 
were not crushing, though the great decrease of manpower, territory, and money led to a loss of 
prestige on the international political scene.84 Furthermore, the terms of the treaty were very one 
sided in nature: while the Seleukids had plenty of obligations, the Romans did not seem to 
reciprocate beyond pledging not to help each other’s enemies.85 Will divides the treaty into five 
categories of clauses including territorial, military, political, economic, and legal; Paltiel divides 
it into only three types: territorial, financial, and alliances.86 The latter model will be followed 
here. In short, the main conditions of the treaty were as follows: Antiochos was  to withdraw from 
Asia Minor west of the Taurus, was forbidden a large navy, mercenary recruitment from Roman 
influenced areas, elephants, and certain political actions, and he was to pay an indemnity of 15000 
talents, which, according to Harris, was “hardly to be called an indemnity.”87  
 The treaty had many effects on Antiochos III’s kingdom, even before it was ratified by 
either side. Immediately after the first terms were set after Magnesia, Antiochos was required to 
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surrender twenty political hostages which were to be exchanged every three years; among those 
hostages was the future Antiochos IV. These circumstances, along with the required payments, 
kept the Seleukids in an inferior position.88 In addition to demoting Seleukid power, the treaty 
sought to maintain a constant relationship between the two states. The treaty was concerned with 
the idea of state relations between the Romans and the Seleukids, with Polybios noting that it 
proclaimed friendship for all time between them; later in 173 Antiochos IV had his ambassador 
Apollonios renew this alliance and friendship.89 
 Perhaps the most significant result of the treaty of Apameia was the loss of Seleukid 
territory in Asia Minor, where the war was ultimately decided and was essentially the entirety of 
the territory which changed hands as a result.90 This loss, firstly, separated the Seleukids from the 
cities in Asia Minor, removing any power which they could derive from them.91 Secondly, did to 
leave Asia Minor mean to withdraw physically from the geographical area, or does it mean to 
relinquish their intangible territorial claim? Polybios uses the verb ‘ἐκχωρεῖν’ to describe the 
withdrawal, which here has a double meaning to both physically leave and to relinquish claim, and 
Antiochos agreed to evacuate behind the Taurus.92 The purpose of the Roman terms was to prevent 
a resurgence of Seleukid power; they needed to deny Antiochos any point of strategic advantage 
in the western end of the Taurus range. A problem was that the ‘cistauric’ region was undefined 
with reference to the western end of the range.93  
The formerly Seleukid portions of Asia Minor were divided between Eumenes II and 
Rhodes, who both benefitted greatly from Rome’s generosity; the redistribution was meant to 
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create a balance of power and the territory was allegedly given as “gifts” to them from Rome, 
which took no territory for itself and did not yet establish a province east of the Adriatic. The 
Roman army and fleet were recalled completely to Italy.94 Eumenes was even awarded a part of 
Mysia which Prusias of Bithynia had previously taken from him and then still occupied, although 
the Scipios had guaranteed the inviolability of his kingdom in 190 for Prusias’ agreement to not 
side with Antiochos, a fact which would soon cause friction between these two kingdoms.95 
Rome’s generous gift to Eumenes meant that he was left as a bulwark against future disturbances 
in the east, wedged between the Seleukids, Antigonids, Bithynia, Cappadocia, Galatia, and with 
Pontus nearby.96 Although their empire was reduced, despite the loss of Asia Minor the Seleukids 
still commanded a huge kingdom.97 
 The indemnity clause is also one of the heavier terms which the Seleukids had to endure at 
this time, since it was inordinately large. Antiochos was ordered to pay the Roman war costs, 
which the Scipios estimated generously to be at 15000 Euboean talents of silver, broken down into 
500 talents paid on the spot, another 2500 upon the ratification of the treaty, and an additional 
12000 at equal installments yearly for twelve years, and furthermore they were to pay Eumenes 
350 talents and an additional 127 talents in lieu of grain.98 The initial demand was not arbitrary as 
it was meant to reflect the Roman war costs. Although it was an exaggerated estimation and a very 
high amount, it was not enough to cause any provocation.99 This was another way in which the 
Romans were able to budget and limit the dangers which the Seleukids could pose; it is possible 
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that they estimated the potential of the kingdom with input from Pergamon and Rhodes before 
specifying the amount. Compared to other recent indemnities which Rome imposed Antiochos’ 
was huge. It was both larger and due more quickly than any of its contemporaries and placed the 
Seleukids at a huge disadvantage, likely purposely, to Roman allies in the area.100 This indemnity 
was also a way in which the Romans could test Seleukid allegiance over an extended period of 
time, giving them the ability to assess political developments within the empire and to gain some 
external control.101 Derow remarks that the war against Antiochos was the most profitable up to 
that point for the Romans, and the massive influx of money forever altered their economy.102 
 The final clause type related to alliances and military restriction. The treaty called for the 
Seleukid navy to be reduced to only 10 decked ships, with smaller craft, and no sailing west of 
Cape Sarpedonium in Cilicia unless delivering payment, hostages, or ambassadors.103 This 
essentially barred Antiochos from legally entering the Aegean; the surrender of the main fleet 
broke the naval power of the Seleukids.104 After Apameia Vulso sent orders for the ships at Patara 
to be destroyed, and 50 were either broken up or burned.105 Furthermore, Antiochos was not 
allowed to initiate any invasion, but he could repel one provided that he in no way profited from 
doing so.106 He was not allowed to recruit mercenaries or volunteers for his military from any of 
the areas which was vaguely termed as “sub dicione populi Romani sunt”.107 Finally, Antiochos 
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was no longer permitted to keep or raise elephants, and was supposed to hand over all he had; Livy 
also reports that Vulso gave all of the elephants which he had received to Eumenes as a gift.108 
 Another, more indirect result of Antiochos’ defeat at Magnesia was the loss of territory and 
allies in the east, who took advantage of Seleukid misfortunes to assert their independence. 
Antiochos III’s complicated system of alliances and agreements at least partially survived under 
Seleukos, but the defeat at Magnesia showed weakness in the empire where only twenty years 
prior Antiochos had asserted some level of control.109 Modern scholars disagree on what exactly 
the state of the eastern satrapies was when Seleukos inherited their rule. Particularly uncertain are 
areas such as Media and Persia, though it can be said with some certainty that Seleukos controlled 
Cilicia, part of Pamphylia, Syria, Mesopotamia, Susiana, and Babylonia, in addition to the more 
recent territorial acquisition of Koile Syria and Phoenicia.110 Swain claims that there was 
significant discontent and separatist movements in the latter two portions of the Empire.111 
However, this seems not to have been the case, given that Josephus relates that the Jewish 
population at least was treated well and content under Antiochos III and Seleukos, and gives no 
indication of discontent there.112 
Grainger offers the following analysis on some of the difficulties which Antiochos, and 
Seleukos eventually, encountered. They faced dangers from both the east and south as a result of 
territorial loss, from Parthia and Armenia in the east and the Nabataean kingdom in the south, all 
former Seleukid dependencies who were becoming more formidable. The Parthians rebelled and 
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the new king Arsaces IV declared his independence.113 In Armenia, two native dynasts who were 
strategoi of Antiochos threw off their allegiance and assumed the title of king, Zariandros in 
Sophene and Artaxias in Armenia proper.114 There is no information of what happened further 
east; Elam was the object of Antiochos’ final campaign, and according to Mørkholm he likely lost 
control of Baktria and Media as well, since the Greco-Baktrian kingdom began raiding.115 What 
exactly the Seleukids fully controlled of the eastern Asian portion of the empire is not entirely 
clear. After suppressing the rebellion of Achaios in Asia Minor during his early reign, Antiochos 
III had sought to gain control over the territory which preceding generations had lost; as a result 
he turned first his attention to both reassertion in the east and then later to the recovery of Koile 
Syria from the Ptolemies (by 200). He had reestablished himself in Armenia by 212, Hyrkania, the 
Satrapies of Parthia, Baktria, and Sogdiana, Areia, Arachrosia, “India”, and even possibly 
Karmania. It seems however that the major work of this expedition had been diplomatic rather 
than militaristic. There was only an assurance that the east was Seleukid so long as both he and his 
negotiating partners lived, and there was no indication that he could even call on the kings for 
times of war.116 This makes a concrete understanding of the eastern portion of the empire more 
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difficult to assess. Although there were yet no direct threats made against the Seleukid realm, these 
were still factors in which Seleukos needed to remain vigilant. 
The east was not the only place in which the Seleukids lost allies; those in Asia Minor also 
faced issues if they continued a strong association with the Seleukids. A notable example of this 
is Ariarathes IV of Cappadocia, who had both helped Antiochos fight in Asia Minor and had 
married his daughter Antiochis. In 189 Ariarathes surrendered to Vulso, and not long after in 188 
gave Eumenes his own daughter in marriage and secured for himself better peace terms; he fought 
against the Galatians and remained a faithful ally of Pergamon until his own death.117 
Antiochos left his co-ruling son Seleukos in charge when he departed for the upper 
satrapies again in 187 on his final campaign, which eventually would make for a smooth 
succession.118 He died on the 3rd or 4th of July in 187, at a temple of Bel in Elam (Elymais) near 
Susa at the age of 53.119 The nature of Antiochos’ campaign is still contested, the most common 
view is that he was plundering the temple due to financial problems caused by the indemnity, as 
reported by Polybios, Justin, and Diodorus. The theme of temple plundering was to become a 
familiar one in Seleukid historiography from this point on.120 The story of Antiochos’ death is 
usually built upon a foundation consisting of his desire to renew his exploits against Ekbatana, 
which he had accomplished in 211/0. While pillaging the temple there he experienced resistance 
from the local population and was killed by the mob “comme un vulgaire bandit.”121 While plunder 
is the common explanation, there surely would have been political implications; the east needed 
to know that they were still firmly under a strong Seleukid rule after the heavy defeat Antiochos 
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had suffered in the west, and it is most likely that he was trying to reassert his hold on places like 
Parthia, Baktria, or Media.122 Furthermore, in the same passage in which he points to the need for 
plunder, Diodorus records that Antiochos accused the people of Elam of starting a war against 
him.123 This is a plausible explanation for why he was in direct conflict with the citizens there. 
With his father dead, Seleukos was the sole ruler of the Seleukid Empire. The earliest date 
for his sole rule is July 19, 187, and he is attested continuously until 175 in the Astronomical 
Diaries.124 Seleukos was about thirty years old around this time, since he is first attested in public 
in 197/6; this first attestation may have been his entry into political life, when he must have been 
around 18 years old.125 A lot of what Seleukos would do during his reign was a direct result of the 
defeat at Magnesia in 189. He obtained the throne through an easy and smooth succession, as he 
was already serving as co-ruler and general and was in Syria at the time.126 Gera deems his 
ascension to the throne to have been positive for the status of the Seleukid Empire since he sees 
Antiochos as being ill equipped for the patient healing and rebuilding task ahead, for which 
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Chapter IV: The Significance of the Treaty of Apameia 
 As has been mentioned often thus far, many modern scholars cite the treaty of Apameia as 
a foil to Seleukos’ productivity during his reign.128 This position accepts that the treaty of Apameia 
was legally binding for Seleukos even after the death of his father in 187, such as Green says, who 
posits that he followed the terms with “scrupulous correctness”.129 There are also those, especially 
Paltiel, who believe that the conditions of the treaty were rendered legally invalid once the original 
Seleukid party was gone. Whether or not Seleukos was bound to Apameia, it is apparent that in 
either of these two viewpoints the result of his reign was the same: the treaty of Apameia’s role in 
Seleukos’ reign produced the same outcome whether or not it was valid for him. That is not to say 
that there were no consequences as a result of the Seleukid defeat and that the spirit of the treaty 
did not carry at least some weight in the years after 188, but rather that the terms of the treaty in 
itself do not appear to have hindered Seleukos in any of his activities. Whether he was legally 
bound by them or not, he appears to have largely ignored those which would not bring him into 
direct physical conflict with Rome.  
Wherever the accounts of Seleukos seem to show him conscientiously adhering to the 
treaty, it is possible to argue that in fact he was simply trying to avoid the provocation of a second 
war with Rome. It will be shown below that terms of the treaty that were immediately put into 
effect, such as the loss of territory, were the only ones which were truly detrimental to Seleukos’ 
reign, and that whether the treaty remained valid or not his actions reflecting some of the major 
clauses would not have changed. It is true that there is no positive evidence that Seleukos ever 
directly transgressed the stipulations of the treaty; it is possible that Seleukos renegotiated a 
friendship with the Romans, since Polybios’ account of the treaty emphasizes the importance of 
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“φιλία” for its purpose in the opening lines.130 Nevertheless, some scholars support the argument 
that the treaty was invalid after the death of Antiochos and, while the renunciation of territory was 
valid, that all the other clauses concerning military and political situation were reopened with the 
king’s death.131 
 The territorial clause was the one which would have the most direct and lasting effect on 
the Seleukids and Seleukos himself, since it was meant to be a one-time effect which would remain 
valid whether the treaty did or not. The Seleukid armies evacuated Asia Minor and surrendered 
the land to the Romans.132 The Taurus boundary was meant to be permanent and the land which 
was previously Seleukid controlled was immediately distributed amongst Roman friends; by 
renouncing his claim to any European territory and Asia Minor, Antiochos III automatically 
deprived his heirs of any right there.133 When he died, since he had agreed wholly to this, the 
claims and titles to those lands could not simply be resurrected and therefore the result of this 
clause was the same regardless of Seleukos’ obligation to the treaty. 
 The next clause is that concerning Seleukid naval power, in which the treaty states that 
they were restricted to those ten ships and were not allowed to sail past Cape Sarpedonium. 
Polybios specifies that the treaty forbade more than ten decked ships for war with more than thirty 
oars.134 The importance of the Seleukid navy is highlighted here by the fact that this was a major 
consideration in the original treaty.135 There are arguments for this part of the treaty remaining 
valid for Seleukos, most often cited in conjunction with the naval clause is Seleukos’ offer to give 
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ten ships to the Achaians as a gesture of friendship.136 Mørkholm explains this offer as Seleukos 
attempting to reduce his navy to comply with the treaty, while Gera claims that he was interested 
in giving away his allotted ten ships and replacing them with a modernized navy thereby keeping 
his skilled boat craftsmen practiced.137 The latter is less convincing, since it seems unlikely he 
would be interested in giving up all of his ships, and Gruen asserts contrarily that the gift in fact 
implied that the Seleukids were still a naval power able to spare the ships for the Achaians.138 
Another viewpoint, if Seleukos was legally bound by Apameia, is that he simply ignored that 
clause altogether, and the appearance of a ship’s prow on Seleukid coinage during this period was 
perhaps to advertise continued maintenance of the fleet in defiance of the Roman conditions placed 
on Antiochos at least.139 
 It is more likely, however, that Seleukos began to recuperate the navy as soon as the royal 
treasury allowed for it.140 The conveyance of his daughter to Perseus for marriage by the Rhodian 
fleet in 179 is often used as proof that he adhered to the terms of the treaty in naval respects. The 
use of the Rhodian fleet, however, need not mean that Seleukos had no fleet of his own: while the 
treaty did not forbid any modest bridal processions at sea if Seleukos had sent an appropriately 
magnificent fleet past Cape Sarpedonium into the Aegean it surely would have been enough 
provocation to bring the wrath of Rome.141 The destruction of the Seleukid fleet was another 
immediate effect which happened only once and was still part of the conditions carried out while 
Antiochos was still alive. Part of the fleet was abandoned at Patara in Lycia and a Roman force 
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eventually destroyed it there soon after the ratification of the treaty.142 Even with this, the entire 
Seleukid navy was not at Patara, and even if all of those ships were destroyed primary sources 
make no mention of any pursuit of the fleet which had been under Hannibal’s command.143 
Furthermore, in 170 Antiochos IV had a large naval force which Grainger believes likely included 
ships that had been built for deployment in 192/1.144 He used this same fleet with which he had 
invaded Cyprus in 168, and later that same year Popilius Laenas did not rebuke him for possession 
of a fleet during his intervention at Eleusis later that same year.145 It follows that, since this was 
not very far into Antiochos IV’s reign, Seleukos either possessed a fleet through his reign or was 
building new ships of which Antiochos was able to make use. 
 The treaty also forbade the breeding and maintenance of an elephant corps, which the 
Seleukids had used since the time of Seleukos I, and it does seem that elephants remained a part 
of the Seleukid realm for quite some time after Apameia. If Seleukos was bound by the treaty, then 
it seems that the elephant clause was only provisionally enforced by Rome and later fell to the 
wayside, perhaps due to the challenge of collecting all the elephants from Apameia and ensuring 
there were no more in the kingdom.146 As already mentioned, Livy notes that some elephants were 
taken and given to Eumenes by Vulso; perhaps this was the elephant corps which had fought in 
Asia and survived Magnesia.147 Polybios says that all the elephants at Apameia were confiscated, 
and that elephants elsewhere were forbidden by the treaty.148 The display of elephant imagery in 
bronze coinage, issued at Antioch during the reign of Seleukos, perhaps alluded to the surviving 
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elephant corps in Syria contrary to Rome’s orders; similarly, although the Seleukid navy was 
supposed to have been gutted, ships’ prows continue to appear on Seleukid coinage.149 On various 
later occasions elephants are clearly still part of the army: they are at Daphne in 166, Antiochos 
IV left them with his vice regent Lysias during his eastern campaign in 165, who in turn used them 
in Judaea in 163.150 Shortly after the death of Antiochos IV in the reign of Antiochos V, the senate 
sent Cn. Octavius to Syria partly to hamstring the elephants and burn the ships in 163/2.151 
Sherwin-White and Kuhrt believe that this was simply a delayed implementation of the treaty and 
Appian says that Rome sent Octavius after learning that “there were more elephants in Syria and 
more ships than had been allowed to Antiochos in the treaty.”152 Although this “treaty” is likely 
Apameia, there is no mention of the treaty elsewhere as a justification and Polybios himself states 
there that this was likely done to cripple Seleukid power and to better control the kingdom. 
 The Seleukid armies made fairly significant use of mercenary soldiers to augment their 
battle lines, so the clause which forbade recruitment from areas of Roman influence and slowed 
army building would at first glance seem to be somewhat problematic for the royal army. Even if 
the treaty remained valid for Seleukos after the death of Antiochos III, it did not stop the Seleukids 
afterwards from recruiting anyway. The same elephant type coins of Seleukos IV which showed 
maintenance of the elephant corps suggest too that they were intended for distribution to the 
military perhaps as sitarchia or “ration pay”, a theory which is supported by finds at the military 
colony at Dura.153 Rome became suspicious of Antiochos IV and Polybios reports that the Romans 
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sent spies (ambassadors “κατασκόπων ἔχοντες τάξιν”) to the parade at Daphne in 166, who saw 
nothing wrong to report despite the fact that the army there reportedly consisted of Mysians, 
Thracians, and even Galatians, all of whom most likely fell under the dicio of the Romans.154 This 
group of Romans was led by an experienced ex-censor who would have surely noticed any flagrant 
violation of a valid treaty, further showing that it was most likely ended in 187.155 Since the treaty 
was either legally invalidated by Antiochos III’s death or was never fully implemented, Grainger 
believes the armies of Antiochos IV to have been as large as Antiochos III’s despite the loss of 
Asia Minor, which makes it all the more likely that recruiting and the military were maintained 
under Seleukos IV, even if they were not employed on campaign.156 
 In addition to restricting maritime movement, the treaty of Apameia also attempted to 
restrict the Seleukid expansion by land and alliances with other kingdoms. One of the major 
arguments in favour of Seleukos being bound by the treaty is centered on his action, or rather near 
action, of marching an army to the Taurus in 181/0 to aid his cousin Pharnakes I of Pontus against 
a coalition led by Eumenes. In Diodorus’ account, when he arrives at the Taurus Seleukos suddenly 
remembers a treaty which his father had with the Romans.157 It is not clear what exactly he 
remembered since the fragment of Diodorus ends abruptly there, and the event is not mentioned 
in what remains of the accounts of Polybios or Livy, but it is more likely that in this case Seleukos 
would not consider this a violation of the treaty in any case since he was not planning to annex the 
territory.158 Seleukos hesitated to cross the Taurus, not because of the treaty but rather because he 
could not risk fighting with Pergamon and Cappadocia and risk angering Rome by damaging her 
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allies. It was also rumored that Ptolemy V was preparing for a war to regain Koile Syria, and so 
removing soldiers with which he may have needed to use to defend Syria was a concern, though 
that threat was gone in 180.159 It is also possible that T. Flamininus was able to successfully 
dissuade Seleukos from taking Pharnakes’ side, since he was at that time in Asia Minor on an 
embassy to Prusias of Bithynia and may also have visited Seleukos as well.160 Seleukos simply 
could not have been unaware of a treaty valid for him before that moment, so why would he have 
suddenly remembered at the last second? Gera explains this in terms of pro-Roman propaganda 
which would attack Seleukos from two angles: first, that he was too cowardly to actually commit 
to war, and second, in contradiction to the first, that he was despicable enough to be willing to 
make aggressive movement against Rome and possibly break the treaty. This reflects the animosity 
towards the king and could have been a Pergamene-fabricated rumor made to damage Seleukid 
reputation in Rome, something which Eumenes also engaged in against Perseus to suit his own 
ends.161 
 Finally, Seleukos did not pay the indemnity as Rome had stipulated. Why Seleukos 
continued to pay the indemnity is difficult to discern if the treaty was invalidated with Antiochos’ 
death, since he continued to pay it for quite some time, though presumably this is due to the 
hostages being held in Rome. They were the only guarantee for the payment and they faced a tacit 
threat if they treaty was breached. There is also the possibility that, while there may not have been 
a legal obligation, there may have been a moral obligation for Seleukos to pay his father’s debt. 
Although the hostages may have kept him paying initially, Seleukos simply stopped paying the 
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indemnity during the middle of his reign; the final payment to Rome should have been in 177/6, 
but Antiochos IV made the full payment of the indemnity as a lump sum in 174/3 shortly after his 
reign began.162 II Maccabees also mentions even later that a certain Nikanor wanted to complete a 
payments in 165; Le Rider believes these may have been an end to the Apameia debts.163 Since 
Antiochos IV so quickly had the according resources available, did this mean that Seleukos was 
able to pay the indemnity but was unwilling to do so? In the end, the Seleukids still payed the 
indemnity in full with Antiochos IV’s apologies, and he must have felt that it was an obligation to 
pay since Demetrios, Seleukos’ oldest son who was then a Roman hostage, was hardly an effective 
incentive for Antiochos.164 Again, however, it is presumably the lack of legal grounds which 
accounts for the late payments, making Antiochos’ apologies ironic; it seems that Antiochos would 
be more willing to pay Rome due to his time spent there and his political connections with the 
Romans.165 Certainly, at the very least, Seleukos was delaying in making the payments, and Rome 
did not seem to care much about the fact that the indemnity was not coming as scheduled.166  
 The question remains from this: why was there no Roman intervention as a result of 
Seleukos not adhering to the settlement at Apameia? In the more likely case that the treaty was 
made invalid for Seleukos by Antiochos III’s death, the answer here is straightforward. The treaty 
of Apameia established philia between the Roman people and Antiochos for all time.167 Livy 
records that “amicitia regi Antiocho cum populo Romano…esto,” and there is no mention of either 
Seleukos or Antiochos’ regnum; the Romans never seemed to care about any supposed 
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transgression of the Seleukids after that, and the sources dwell on this friendship aspect.168 It is 
likely that the treaty was not meant by either side to be hereditary for Antiochos; treaties of the 
period refer to Hellenistic rulers by name and did not attribute a corporate existence to their 
kingdom, and it was necessary and significant to have a succession clause written into them; it is 
most likely that the Romans understood that Antiochos was not an immortal when they included 
“for all time” in the treaty’s wording.169  
Furthermore, the renewal of friendship with later Seleukids such as Antiochos IV is not 
sufficient evidence of the expiry of the original treaty. That any renewal took place between 
Seleukos and Rome is plausible but entirely unproven, and a renewal of friendship was not 
necessary for the renewal of a treaty. The sources on Apameia do however offer sufficient grounds 
for the view that the provisions of the treaty had no legal grounds after Antiochos’ death, and that 
both the relationship between Seleukos and Rome was dependent on the Taurus boundary and 
periodic renewal of friendship. There is moreover no further mention in the primary sources of the 
treaty even when it would suit Roman advantage.170 Nevertheless, Roman power meant that it was 
probably sensible for Seleukos to observe some of the main elements of the treaty.171 Although the 
power of the republic was always lurking in the background as a potential aid to her allies and 
embassies regularly appeared at Rome requesting help, their pronouncements were little more than 
gestures and Hellenistic states operated along traditional lines and hardly reflected Roman 
hegemony.172 
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 Even if the treaty were still valid for Seleukos, there were still many reasons why Rome 
would not intervene in the east. It is entirely possible that, while the boundary of the Taurus 
originally placed by the Scipios survived, the written treaty was simply not relevant to both 
sides.173 At this time especially the Romans were very focused on Macedon and Greece, rather 
than yet that far eastward.174 In either case, a working system of international law in which such a 
treaty as Apameia would need to remain serviceable is only good when there is an effective 
mechanism for enforcement, and an absence of international law and the inability to enforce it is 
a recurring event in Polybios.175 The following are a number of reasons why Rome may have been 
hesitant to commit their forces to Asia. Taken one by one, these reasons may not have been enough 
on their own, though compounded they would have kept Rome out of Seleukos’ sphere. 
 First was Rome’s concerns of war and internal rebellion on home soil in Italy. That Romans 
had major fears of invasion is clear: in 200 P. Sulpicius Galba convinced the senate that war with 
Philip V was inevitable and they should fight in Macedon away from Italy.176 This fear is no 
surprise, bearing in mind that Hannibal’s terror-inspiring invasion had not been ended for a full 20 
years when Seleukos took power and that Antiochos had taken Hannibal into his court as an 
advisor.177 Another major result of the Second Punic War was that Rome had lost supremacy over 
Italy after Cannae and throughout the course of that conflict.178 Hannibal’s invasion had split the 
Italian allies of Rome, since Hannibal had victories to back the tempting offers he made to those 
who seceded. Furthermore there was a real danger of renewed defection among those Italian allies 
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who were suffering from Rome’s punishment for those who had defected to Carthage.179 In 193, 
some of the more astute members of the senate did not discount the possibility of an invasion of 
Italy, such as Hannibal suggested to Antiochos, based on the assumption that there would be Italian 
support against Rome.180 This distrust of the allies led to the establishment of military colonies in 
Italy which were at least partially situated, or specifically intended, to deal with internal 
dissatisfaction. Colonies such as Saturnia, founded 183 and was well placed to deal with 
dissatisfaction in Etruria, were larger in population and were given Roman citizenship rather than 
Latin, the first inland colonies to gain such, perhaps to keep loyalty.181  Eight military colonies 
were established in southern Italy in 197 and 194, probably to guard the coast of Campania, 
Lucania, and Apulia, but also to watch the interior which was particularly hostile and rebellions, 
and those which followed in the 180s in northern Italy were attempts to pacify and urbanize the 
area, like Mutina.182 
 Rome’s political climate at this time also may have restrained them from venturing into the 
rich east; as said above, the influx of wealth from the war with Antiochos forever changed Rome. 
In 189, M. Acilius Glabrio abandoned his bid for censorship because of accusations that he had 
mishandled booty taken from Antiochos, with M. Porcius Cato as the witness.183 Another major 
event during the 180s in Rome was the so called “Trial of the Scipios”, which took place in either 
187 or 184.184 Of this trial very little is known and equally as much is agreed upon. Exactly who 
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was on trial is unclear, it may have been Lucius Scipio, Publius Scipio, or even both, and the date 
is contested, although Astin believes that it may have been Lucius on trial in 187 and his brother 
Publius in 184.185 The nature of the charges is disputed, either a bribe from Antiochos, a 
misappropriation of funds used in the war, or even something within Publius’ private dealings with 
Antiochos. There were demands that Lucius submit accounts of the 500 talents which Antiochos 
had originally given over after Magnesia, and it is even possible that only Lucius was on trial and 
Publius was only implicated in his intervention.186 One can see the common threat between these 
two scandals: the Seleukids and the eastern wealth, which the senate may have been hesitant to 
gain more of too quickly. Rome was also having problems with the spread of a supposed 
Bacchanalian cult conspiracy in 186, which the consuls suppressed after it had been left to flourish 
for a number of years; contrary to Roman morals the Bacchanalian cultists allegedly practiced 
nocturnal rights which were reported to have degenerated into sexual depravity and ritual murder, 
and the cult was only fully eliminated by 181.187 Again, because this cult was similar to some 
which were found in the eastern world it may have led to enhanced concern about eastern Asiatic 
cultures, where the Romans would have to go in order to deal with Seleukos themselves. 
 Asia Minor was not the only theater of war for the Romans in the early second century. For 
some time, Rome had been working towards conquering the Iberian Peninsula and subjugating 
Spain.188 In 197 serious war broke out and the senate sent Cato there with a consular army to deal 
with the problem.189 Attacks on the Celtiberians had only turned them to enemies and the fighting 
lasted many years on a large scale; it was not until 179/8 that Ti. Gracchus came and closed that 
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stage of the war with a system that brought relief until 171.190 Little changed in Spain during the 
180s: three governors died and four were awarded triumphs for victories against the Lusitanians 
and the Celtiberians.191 In 180 the governor of Citerior Spain, Q. Fulvius Flaccus, won a decisive 
victory against the Celtiberians which led to a period of relative calm until the 150s, and the army 
of the Romans was even reduced to one legion instead of two.192 This shows that Rome during 
Seleukos reign was at least partially focused westward, dealing with the control of Spain instead 
of concerning themselves solely with Asia. 
 The final, most clear reason for which Rome would not have intervened if the treaty were 
still legally valid for Seleukos is Eumenes II of Pergamon, on whom there was a heavy expectation 
to control the east for Rome after they had withdrawn back to Italy. Apameia confirmed 
Pergamon’s position of freedom from Seleukid influence, and afterward Eumenes was able to deal 
with them from a position of strength.193 His loyalty to Rome was awarded with a large territorial 
gain which expanded the Attalid kingdom to its largest size, but in giving this gift to Eumenes (and 
another one Rhodes) Rome certainly would have expected their generosity to be appreciated and 
gratefully acknowledged as in do ut des.194 Eumenes would have been expected to provide 
guarantees of order and the prevention of anything rising to disturb Rome, especially since his 
newly expanded territory bordered directly on three of the major four powers in the area.195 Asia 
Minor would have been too much of a political burden for Rome to keep for itself, especially since 
they were already dealing with expansion into the Iberian Peninsula which greatly increased their 
ruling area. The prospect of ruling an even bigger empire than this turned the conservative senate 
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to indirect rule through their ally Eumenes, and they still were not interested in anything beyond 
the Taurus Mountains.196 The senate also passed to Eumenes those cities which had allowed 
Antiochos to establish a base of operations or the royal fleet.197 Rome certainly at this time had a 
desire for their friends Eumenes and Rhodes to maintain a peaceful Greek Aegean world in order 
to gain security at home; they were less interested in the far-away Seleukids or Ptolemies, seeing 
them as harmless enough to leave them to their own quarrels, although later they would become 
more interested in disruption and fermenting internal quarrels.198 However, in the post-Apameia 
world, in general the further from Italy events such as major interstate conflicts happened, the less 
the Romans were interested in them; Roman interaction with Asia Minor and the Levant, because 
they were further than continental Greece, was less frequent at this time and in turn had less impact 
on Rome than those in Greece.199 Because of their physical and political distance from the 
Seleukids, they simply entrusted to Eumenes any activity they may have needed completed. 
 Eumenes, however, had his own wars to wage against the neighbors Rome left him to fend 
against. After Magnesia, Asia Minor’s major powers consisted of Pergamon under Eumenes, 
Bithynia under the talented Prusias I, Pontus under Pharnakes I, and the Galatians – all of whom 
he was expected to keep in check.200 Any semblance of peace there did not last long however: 
already in 187 he was at war with Prusias, which did not end until Roman intervention in 183/2 
after they largely ignored the situation.201 Rome’s presence was almost unfelt since Pergamon had 
gotten the prize, but Prusias had gained plenty of help from other allies against Eumenes including 
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Pharnakes and also Philip V, who had been in dispute with Eumenes already over the Thracian 
cites of Aenus and Maronea.202 In 183 Pharnakes took the city of Sinope, invaded Galatia, and 
began his war with Eumenes; Pergamon was able to claim victory in 181 and instituted the 
Nikephoria festival to commemorate this victory.203 Eumenes was able to hold back the various 
challengers, though this surely left him very busy. Rostovtzeff blames Seleukos’ fear of Rome for 
the lack of a Seleukid presence in any of these relatively nearby conflicts, however it is more likely 
that it was simply a better idea for Seleukos to keep his armies at home while the kingdom was 
recovering.204 While Eumenes could deal with Prusias and Pharnakes in conflicts which eventually 
ended, he had a constant challenge trying to keep control of the Galatian tribes with frequent 
clashes.205 On the other hand, Eumenes was able to make an ally of Cappadocia, marrying 
Ariarathes IV’s daughter Stratonike.206 Still, Rome was the enemy of Eumenes’ enemies so long 
as Rome and Pergamon were allies, but they were very reluctant to involve themselves in the 
affairs of Asia Minor, let alone Syria, until Flamininus’ trip in 183.207 
 Although Eumenes did come under suspicion of the senate later in his kingship, during 
Seleukos’ reign he enjoyed good personal relations with Rome. The suspicions which arose against 
him resulted from his conduct in the war against Perseus in 168/7, the Third Macedonian War, in 
which he was accused of making secret meetings and thinking that he would be able to make a 
fortune as a broker of peace between Rome and Perseus – conduct which the Romans saw as 
dishonest and traitorous.208 Shortly after his disgrace he had to ask Rome for help in fighting 
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Galatians, and because he could not risk angering Rome it was a tacit way for Eumenes to ask 
permission to fight.209 Eumenes was led to believe that as the ally of Rome he had the freedom to 
act as he wanted for nearly 20 years, which Rome tolerated because of their distance; that distance 
too, however, meant that many saw Rome as a far off and disengaged presence.210 This feeling of 
distance may also have extended to Seleukos, who quietly worked on his own realm. 
 Regardless of how modern scholars view the validity of the treaty for Seleukos, the ancient 
sources demonstrate that he certainly was not entirely idle and did not adhere to the terms of that 
treaty in itself. He still controlled a navy, elephants, armies, and as will be seen below made an 
international presence for himself. The treaty was not strictly enforced by the Romans, who seem 
to have cared very little for what was happening in the east at this time, leaving those affairs to 
Eumenes whilst they dealt with many pieces of their own business in the west. 
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Chapter V: Internal Affairs 
 Seleukos may have had a quiet reign, but that is no indication of either incompetence or 
that he lacked any authority in his own kingdom. He may not have been concerned with martial 
glory but he did care about his dignity and his subjects’ welfare in keeping twelve years of 
uninterrupted peace.211 Although there is comparatively less information on Seleukos’ internal 
policies than on his external policies, there is still sufficient evidence of activity within the empire 
to gain an understanding of his actions. Some of the areas for which information from this period 
is available includes typically kingly duties such as ensuring civic honours are given, his religious 
considerations, the practice of city founding, and, perhaps most importantly and most expansively, 
the health of the Seleukid economy. It is best to then start in the area which would have been 
closest to Seleukos, his family. 
 Seleukos married his sister, Laodike IV, and she was associated with him as his queen 
consort. Laodike was married first to her eldest brother Antiochos the Son until his death in 193, 
and was subsequently married to his successor Seleukos, before she possibly married again her 
third brother Antiochos IV after Seleukos died.212 Laodike is the first Seleukid queen to have an 
identifiable portrait on Seleukid coinage, there is no evidence before her of rulers depicting their 
consorts in this “widespread medium”.213 As the producer of royal heirs, Laodike IV also likely 
had an elevated role in the dynasty because of the imprisonment of potential heirs Antiochos (IV) 
and Demetrios, though she certainly already had some importance as both the daughter and wife 
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of Seleukid kings.214 The elephant type coins which were discussed above could again be seen as 
a reference to Seleukid might.215 They were struck under Seleukos and Antiochos IV and used the 
image of their sister-wife to symbolize dynastic stability. She was further the guardian of 
Antiochos the son of Seleukos after his death; certainly there was a level of appreciation from 
Antiochos IV for the ability to marry the sitting queen with the appropriate position and 
connections to smooth that transition.216 Seleukos was able, at least for the time, to secure the 
dynasty by maintaining his marriage with his sister and creating heirs as a good king should. 
 Seleukos continued the kingly tradition of having civic honours and citizenship conferred 
on certain people who had rendered outstanding service for his father. In a letter written in 186, 
Seleukos asked the citizens of Seleukeia to grant a statue and citizenship to a certain 
Aristolochos.217 This letter constitutes the only piece of evidence from Seleukos himself which 
remains from his entire twelve year reign.218 Antiochos III had a lot of rewards to offer, such as 
land and citizenship, from his many military expeditions, and since he perished before being able 
to give them out himself Seleukos continued doing this on his behalf.219 These types of rewards 
not only honored the individual who received them, but also inspired others to demonstrate the 
sort of zeal and goodwill demonstrated by the recipient.220 Although the letter was not phrased as 
an instruction, the residents of Seleukeia were still expected to accept; any city would have 
accepted the request regardless as it was an easy way to gain the king’s favour, since a ‘friend’ 
given a civic identity in one’s city would be like a representative in the king’s court. His 
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instructions were to enroll him in the deme Olympios and the tribe of Laodikeia.221 The letter was 
printed on tablets and placed within the city, most likely intended from the start to be an open letter 
which the public could see; this was one way in which the Seleukids could control their cities.222 
This letter is indicative of a practice of ensuring the proper rewarding of important people and 
civic interaction with his subjects, which may have been more widespread under Seleukos’ rule. 
 The religious affairs of the empire were also an area in which Seleukos ensured that proper 
care was taken. While Seleukos may not have been directly involved in the cults themselves, it is 
clear from their very existence that they were administered to his liking. He was, like his father, a 
supporter of the Jewish Temple at Jerusalem, where he financed the Temple sacrifices by covering 
all the expenses necessary for them from his own personal revenues.223 There is also evidence for 
the cult of the living king under Seleukos in the form of an annual priesthood list from his reign, 
which shows the various priestly roles for ancestor worship with one for Seleukos among the list.224 
Additionally, citizens of the Empire were interested in making sacrifices on behalf of King 
Seleukos, his wife, and his sons, as the administrator of Esangil and the Babylonians did so to the 
gods Bel and Beltija for their lives.225 Seleukos tightened the royal grip on sanctuaries for better 
administration and oversight of finances, and one known action which Seleukos seems to have 
taken was to consolidate administration in Koile Syria and Phoenicia.226 
 Seleukos appointed one Olympiodoros to a position of religious significance in Koile Syria 
and Phoenicia, which appointment remains known from a stele dated to around 178.227 This 
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inscription shows evidence of royal interest in sanctuaries and their administration.228 The stele 
bears an official dossier containing three letters from the mid-summer of 178, and the material of 
the stele suggests that it was once erected in a sanctuary in a polis or village of Seleukid Palestine. 
Seleukos’ letter is the oldest chronologically; it is addressed from Seleukos to Heliodoros, and is 
an order phrased as a letter would be.229 In the letter Seleukos expresses his interest in the safety 
of his subjects and declares that a kingdom works best when they can pursue interests without fear. 
He made it clear that he intended to introduce ‘proper’ care to Koile Syria and Phoenicia like to 
other places and ‘traditional honours’, which refers to the variety of local cults rather than the royal 
one.230 This position seems to have been similar in significance to the one to which Antiochos III 
appointed a man named Nikanor in Asia Minor as “high priest of all sanctuaries beyond the 
Taurus”. The position later had the secondary responsibility of watching over “revenues and other 
matters” around 209.231 It is certainly possible that Olympiodoros was appointed to the high 
priesthood for Koile Syria and Phoenicia since there is so much symmetry between his 
appointment and Nikanor’s. Thus his role would be to take care of the sanctuaries and give them 
the honours which were given elsewhere in the Empire.232  
 If Seleukos was aware and disapproving of the lack of control over the cults in the area 
could it have been, as the surviving evidence shows, that it was ten years after the start of his reign 
that he began to take action over it? The answer to this seems to be that he needed the time to work 
in the new system of administration over the old Ptolemaic one. When Antiochos III took Koile 
Syria and Phoenicia in 200, the governor of the area named Ptolemaios son of Thaseas switched 
                                                          
228 Capdetrey 2007, 98; Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 193. 
229 Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 191-2, 194-5; the material of the stele is of stone taken from the Judaean hills. 
230 Cotton and Wörrle 2007, 196-7; it is also possible that Seleukos expressing fear for the safety of his subjects is 
indicative of some Jewish unrest in that area, as it was certainly a problem of the later Seleukids. 
231 Jones 2009, 104. 




to Antiochos’ side but retained the titles he had born under the Ptolemies, strategos kai archiereus; 
no one else in the Seleukid Empire had the same combination of titles, and there was elsewhere a 
separation of the secular and sacred power.233 His successors were known simply as strategoi, so 
Seleukos must have reformed the title when the office was separated after Ptolemaios.234 
 Very little is known about Seleukos’ share of city founding within the kingdom. Kosmin 
believes that he was founding cities and colonies although which and where are largely unknown 
with the one exception of the refoundation of Laodikeia-in-Phoenicia, which was originally named 
Berytos.235 That he would found a city in Phoenicia makes sense, since it was only in the fold of 
the Seleukid Empire since 200. So little information remains that the founder cannot be positively 
identified as Seleukos; it could have been Antiochos IV. It is known that it was founded during the 
twenty year period of their respective reigns and that both Seleukos and Antiochos had Laodikai 
in their lives after whom the city may have been named (mother, sisters, and wives). The name of 
the city as Laodikeia-in-Phoenicia is not attested in epigraphic or numismatic sources after the 
second century.236 From this possible foundation it can be inferred that Seleukos perhaps took part 
in some city foundation practices, though the evidence for this is slim. 
 The Seleukid economy has been the subject of much discussion in the post-Apameia 
period. The state of the economy is difficult to assess with certainty for this time, though there is 
plenty of supporting information of the many complicating factors which arose from the defeat at 
Magnesia. The loss of Asia Minor and the payment of the indemnity often seem to lead some 
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scholars to believe that Seleukos’ treasury was in a poor state. This however does not seem to be 
entirely the case, as will be shown below.  
Rostovtzeff wrote extensively on the Hellenistic economy; Austin, however, has critiqued 
Rostovtzeff’s views of kings and economy.237 Austin argues that Rostovtzeff presents kingship 
and royal government too personally, and that he credits kings in general for organizing and 
integrating the territories under their control and developing their resources, while leaving little 
room for the temperament and personality of the kings. Austin sees monarchies as personal 
regimes, and analysis of them requires room to account for irrational motives. Furthermore, 
Rostovtzeff has no concrete definition of economy: his consists of productive economic processes 
such as agriculture and trade but does not include those nonproductive processes like war. He 
explains the economy in 19th century terms and treats war as an irrational and intrusive force, 
hardly mentioning the revenues of war and their consequences. War was a potentially prosperous 
business (as it can still be today), and the Seleukids made plenty of war. Seleukos himself did not, 
a fact which is worth keeping in mind. 
 In total, Seleukos’ output of money in tetradrachms was not very different than either his 
father or brother.238 Houghton and Lorber say that there was an increase in production at the 
Antioch mint on Seleukos’ succession to account for the indemnity.239 To the contrary, Le Rider 
states that the indemnity imposed by the Romans did not arouse any greater production among the 
kingdom’s mints, because the king was able to collect enough currencies of any kind to levy the 
1000 talents per year without needing to strike large amounts of cash; the extant documentation 
indicates the more likely case that activity in the mints was “quite normal” under Seleukos IV.240 
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Overall it appears from workshops and emission volume that Seleukos did not suffer very 
extensively after 188, and the only real challenge was in silver quantities for the payment to 
Rome.241 The silver shortage for Seleukos at this time, in conjunction with the loss of Asia Minor’s 
silver mines, can probably be attributed to the indemnity payments.242 Seleukos also reorganized 
the Antioch mint, which is especially apparent in its production of bronze tetradrachms.243 
Aperghis believes that the mints of the time were only producing what was necessary for the 
satrapies of the kingdom, though again with the production of the elephant type Houghton and 
Lorber argue that production must have been at least partially driven by military needs.244 
 The ‘financial crisis’ of the empire is a common thread in most modern accounts of 
Seleukos, but did the loss of Asia Minor seriously affect the kingdom? Both Will and Errington 
show Seleukos living an existence of daily financial struggle, as Antiochos III had lived after 
Raphia, and according to them having to pay his army as well as the indemnity to Rome and 
Pergamon made money scarce.245 It is true that generally an increase in territory was an increase 
in revenue, and the opposite was true as well when the territory was decreased such as happened 
to the Seleukids; the loss of Asia Minor meant a massive decrease in territory and its associated 
revenue.246 Scholars such as Le Rider and Houghton and Lorber believe that Seleukos was a 
comparatively non-aggressive because of the financial strain from these factors.247 The loss of Asia 
Minor did deprive the Seleukids of some important revenues, which in turn may have led to some 
internal issues such as unhappy citizens from higher taxation or plundering of temples, though it 
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should be remembered that the Seleukid Empire was still rather large.248 The cost of the indemnity 
may have exceeded the means of the state, and Syria was in a difficult position at the time 
concerning precious metals, especially silver, which previously had come from Asia Minor and 
traded westward.249 A case as proof of Seleukos’ financial poverty is an episode in which his first 
minister was to confiscate the treasure in the Temple of Jerusalem, which was a fairly wealthy 
center that minted its own coins for a time. This incident, along with the allegation that Antiochos 
was plundering temples already in 187 where he died, Mørkholm describes as “eloquent 
testimonies of the financial difficulties of the kings.”250 
 However, it does not seem that money was necessarily a problem for Seleukos. The annual 
revenue of Antiochos III circa 212 were somewhere between 11-15000 talents.251 These would 
have increased with the acquisition of Asia Minor to 15-20000 talents per year and only back down 
to 10-15000 talents again under Seleukos IV, which would have been partially balanced by the 
addition of Koile Syria to the economy. There was no indication that the royal court under Seleukos 
cut down on expenditures. The reigns of Antiochos III and Seleukos mark the peak prosperity of 
Susa under Seleukid rule: Susa was a convergent place for commercial routes enhanced by the 
Babylonian Plain, the Gulf of Persia, and south-west Iran, but allowed commerce at a long distance 
between Syria and India; Koile-Syria was also an important area for the economy, along with the 
hinterland of Mesopotamia and Iran.252 There is evidence to support heightened economic activity 
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in the east: from Seleukos I to Antiochos III relatively few Seleukid coins from Seleukeia-on-
Eulaios (Susa) were found, but by contrast 314 bronze coins were found there from the time of 
Antiochos III, as were an additional 106 from under Seleukos IV. 253 Cohen suggests this reflects 
the presence of merchants in Susa, and also the importance of Susa in trade with the Persian Gulf 
region, which increased significantly as a result of Antiochos III’s eastern campaign between 210 
and 205. Continued Seleukid presence in Susa is attested by a fragmentary decree from 177/6 
which cites Laodike III, wife of Antiochos III and mother of Seleukos.254 
 The loss of Asia Minor created only a passing problem for the Seleukids, and the kings 
who followed Antiochos III were wealthy, with immense territories and a variety of resources. 
They were helped by the fact that Koile Syria and Phoenicia equaled or surpassed Asia Minor in 
prosperity despite the situation initially created problems for Antiochos III.255 From 281 to the 
peace of Apameia, Capdetrey shows that the Seleukids never fully controlled Asia Minor, and 
much of what it claimed to control was a virtual, ideological space; considering this the loss of 
Asia Minor is less damaging.256 Although the kingdom was substantially reduced, Seleukos still 
had lots in his possession: in addition to Susiana, he had Syria, Mesopotamia, Babylonia, Media, 
and Persis under his control, and he was able to draw on the Phoenician port cities for merchant 
vessels.257 There were also commercial routes through central Asia, by route of Ekbatana, and 
through the Persian Gulf to centers in Arabia and India, which brought enormous revenues, and 
the maritime villages in Syria and Cilicia via the grand Phoenician ports which acted as his 
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Mediterranean connection.258 Some of the richest areas of the world at the time were within his 
realm, namely a large portion of the “fertile crescent”, Susiana, the pastureland of Media, timber 
from Cilicia and Syria, textiles from Babylonia for export, purple dye from Tyre, and the 
Phoenician glass factories.259 The acquisition of the Phoenician coast meant that the Seleukids 
were able to control the profit from the most valuable caravan trade in eastern luxury goods like 
perfume, frankincense, pearls, precious stones, and silk.260  
 The indemnity was surely the harshest condition imposed by Rome after Magnesia, the 
heaviest burden placed on Antiochos’ successors, although Rome did not seem to be in any hurry 
to enforce it.261 Though the indemnity was very harsh, it was not enough to derail the Seleukid 
financial situation, however. Seleukos very quickly took over the payments for his father and kept 
good record of his financial actions, and while the annual 1000 talents was an annoyance for the 
treasury it was by no means unsupportable.262 Again, the yearly indemnity of 1000 talents to Rome 
and an additional 70 talents to Eumenes should have been paid in full by 177/6 and 184/3 
respectively; it is often assumed that Seleukos fell behind because of financial woes although there 
is no evidence contrary to Seleukos simply deciding that he no longer wanted to pay.263 Seleukos 
was certainly introducing revenue to the kingdom.264 It is also true that the general prosperity of 
the kingdom was a strong indication of good conditions in the treasury; the conditions for recovery 
were in place but were hard tested by Roman demands, and loose organization and the 
administration system made it difficult to mobilize resources in the interest of the state.265 
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Another matter which may have arisen from financial problems was Seleukos’ interaction 
with the Jewish population of his kingdom, especially shown in the episode at the Temple in 
Jerusalem mentioned above. The region that became Judaea had become a part of the Empire after 
Panion in 200, accounting for roughly two percent of the kingdom’s population and contributing 
about the same amount to the treasury.266 Initially the relationship between the Seleukid royals and 
the Jewish high priests was smooth, Antiochos III with Simon the Just and Seleukos IV with Onias 
III. Under Seleukos, the tribute and taxes from Judaea amounted to near 300 talents annually, either 
as a lump sum or a sum promised by a tax collector.267 The first conflict with the Temple came 
near the end of Seleukos’ reign, when Simon (the prostates tou hierou) came into conflict with the 
high priest Onias III; Simon and his brother Menelaus were Hellenists and primary supporters of 
Seleukid power in Judaea.268 Seleukid kings would not have plundered a temple for no reason; 
however, financial difficulties would make an attempt to do so more likely, if the story is true. II 
Maccabees states that a Seleukos learned of the value of the Temple’s treasury by Simon’s message 
and sent Heliodoros to collect from it, but that Heliodoros failed and returned empty handed. The 
money which was stored there was reported to have been the savings of widows and orphans and 
the deposits of the Tobiad named Hyrcanus, valued at 200 talents of gold and 400 of silver; the 
‘women and children’ were probably added by the author of II Maccabees to make the deed all the 
more dastardly.269 It could have been that Seleukos felt entitled to a share of the treasury, which 
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may be comparable to Antiochos III’s deeds in Elam in 187 and consistent with Antiochos IV’s 
treatment of Judaea afterwards and during the sack of 169.270 
Crass entitlement and greed were not to be the only reasons for which Seleukos might be 
interested in taking part of the Temple’s revenues. For some time Seleukos had provided support 
for the sacrifices of the Temple, in alignment with his predecessors’ policy.271 Simon told Seleukos 
that the riches of the Temple did not match the accounts which were set for the sacrifices.272 
However, if this is true, it meant that Seleukos was demanding only what he thought was justifiably 
still his from the Temple as a result of misappropriated funds which he had given in generosity.273 
Furthermore, Seleukid kings expected part of the temples’ revenues and it may have been that this 
was being withheld and Heliodoros was sent to collect.274 The mandated flow of goods in the 
economy went one way: from the ruled to the ruler, who in turn provided the intangible benefits 
of peace and security. Flow in the opposite direction was at the discretion of the king. Rulers had 
to make concessions to the sensibilities of their subjects, especially those with economic and 
political power, and temples specifically were often beneficiaries of royal gifts.275 The Temple of 
Jerusalem was no exception, Antiochos III had provided for its repair and tax exemptions for 
priests and temple singers among other benefits, and as the central pillar in Judaea’s economy the 
Temple was expected to return his investment.276 The entire story narrated in II Maccabees is 
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primarily an edifying tale to teach the benefits of loyalty to the Lord: Heliodoros is forced to return 
empty-handed and admit the power of God at the end. It could have been a real event without the 
supernatural elements, since it does feature prominent historical figures, and modern scholars do 
not reject the story that Heliodoros tried to take from the temple, but it is more likely that it was 
an agreement between the royal court and the Jews which ended the episode.277  
Heliodoros going to the Temple shows at least the royal court in conflict with the Jews, 
and this surely hurt relations with them in some way.278 The tensions and instability in Jerusalem 
were not isolated under Antiochos IV, the extraction of fund from the temple communities and 
similar trends started under Seleukos IV.279 It could also be the case that the Jewish uprising was 
rather a response to Seleukos’ appointment of Olympiodoros as the overseer of the Temple, which 
placed its autonomy under threat. It may have been interpreted as movement away from Antiochos 
III’s policy of recognizing Jewish autonomy, or even a deliberate action by Seleukos to rebut the 
events of the story which the Jewish writers recorded in II Maccabees.280 A final theory is that 
after defeat at Magnesia weakened the Seleukids there was a rise in national spirit among their 
indigenous subjects such as the Jews or the Arabs.281 It does seem that Seleukos may have been 
the origin of money Seleukid taking from the Temple, though for what reason exactly is hard to 
determine, since initially he seems to have been very benign towards his Jewish subjects.  
 Finally, Seleukos’ first minister Heliodoros himself needs to be addressed. It was common 
for a Seleukid king to have a vizier in his empire such as Hermias was for Antiochos III.282 He 
underlines the importance of those who were close to the king, both personally and institutionally: 
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he was an adelphos of Seleukos as a childhood companion and was quite preeminent in the 
kingdom. Heliodoros was the first destination for all royal orders and was responsible for executing 
those orders, which also included financial responsibilities.283 He was a citizen of Antioch, the son 
of a man named Aischylos.284 That he was close to Seleukos can be shown through two 
monuments, one at Delos, in which he is honored and to which Seleukos himself contributed, and 
also in the stele concerning Olympiodoros, in which Heliodoros is addressed as Seleukos’ intimate 
and trusted advisor.285 Seleukos also trusted Heliodoros enough to have him accompany his 
daughter in the marriage procession to Macedon in 178.286 
The Seleukids after Antiochos III, although wrongly branded as “unsuccessful in their 
political ventures”, were still very wealthy, enough so to pay the enormous indemnity to Rome 
and in the case of Antiochos IV to bestow large gifts on Greek cities, maintain a well-equipped 
army, and display huge wealth at Daphne.287 Based on Antiochos IV’s immediate undertakings in 
foreign policy, it can be assumed that Seleukos’ attempt to consolidate the Empire’s finances was 
not in vain. The indemnity was not as excessive as the tribute Seleukos levied in the kingdom itself 
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Chapter VI: External Affairs 
 After Magnesia the Seleukid Empire was too weak to start a policy of revenge and 
Antiochos III, Seleukos, and Antiochos IV rather focused their efforts towards the east.289 It would 
have been natural for Seleukos to feel bitter as a result of the defeat and humiliation of both himself 
and, to a larger degree, his father at the hands of Rome. As a result of this, the sum of Seleukos’ 
external policies, evidence of which remains in only small amounts, translate to a mostly passive 
hostility towards Rome and her friends and allies: there is no question that the Seleukid sympathies 
at this time lay with those who were not friendly towards Rome, and as an anti-Roman movement 
began to define itself Seleukos may have eventually compromised his neutrality.290 The Romans 
kept a watch on Seleukos; in 183 Flamininus intended to visit Syria, but both the purpose of the 
visit and if he ever made it there are unknown. It is reasonable to assume that the Romans were 
interested in keeping the Seleukids under observation and control.291 With the possible exception 
of this visit the Seleukid court was not sent an embassy from the senate for sixteen years, between 
188 and 172.292 Significantly, Seleukos avoided Rome in turn and no envoys were sent there during 
his reign, which was highly unusual for a kingdom at that time and perhaps wise for him to avoid 
as much as he was able.293 The tranquility and peace of his reign helped the recovery of the 
kingdom, though Mørkholm believes that his dealings with Pharnakes and Perseus show that he 
did not fully grasp the hard lesson learned at Magnesia, and in adhering to political concepts during 
his reign which promoted animosity with Rome and Pergamon he lacked the necessary adjustments 
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to changed conditions for success.294 Seleukos’ policy of befriending other states such as Macedon, 
Rhodes, or Pontus was not popular with Rome and her allies, especially with Eumenes as he felt 
Seleukos was trying to isolate him.295 
 Seleukos spent much of his reign renewing alliances with various other states, connecting 
and building relations with some of the most important players of the time. He continuously tried 
to break the political isolation of the kingdom: during his reign he established merchants and 
shipbuilders from Laodikeia-in-Phoenicia on Delos to better connect himself to the Greek states, 
and he maintained diplomatic relations with certain Greek states, notably Athens and the Achaians, 
although he would have been unable to provide any support had any ever been needed.296  It is 
likely that the alliances he formed for which there is evidence extant are a fraction of those which 
he was able to accomplish.297 His dislike of the Attalids can be shown as early as the incident of 
delivering supplies after Magnesia, and is again shown in these relations by him almost risking 
war with Rome to attack Eumenes.298 
 Seleukos wasted little time in establishing his first interstate connection and as early as 
187/6 a friend of the court was honored in Athens with an inscription for his goodwill to the demos 
and his assistance to some ambassadors in Syria, though it could be that the Athenians were 
working with routine matters of state rather than attempts at friendship.299 Relations between the 
Athenians and the Seleukids were limited in the third century due to the conflicts which the 
Seleukids had with the Ptolemies; after his anabasis Antiochos III had tried to gain goodwill with 
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Greek states including Athens.300 The inscription shows peaceful contact with Seleukos and also 
Athenians at the king’s court, and additionally gifts from Queen Laodike are mentioned as 
presented to the Athenians.301 Another inscription of a joint decree also mentions two distinguished 
families with the Seleukids, the Kerykes and the Eumolpids, who served the cult of Demeter and 
Kore at Eleusis.302 They voted to honour an Epicurean philosopher, Philonides of Laodikeia in 
Syria, and his sons, for his help in assisting Athenian ambassadors who had been sent to the king.303 
Although the Romans continued to meddle in Greek affairs, it did not stop Athens from “enjoying 
excellent relations with Seleukos IV”.304 
 The Achaian League was another group which Seleukos befriended. It had fought on the 
side of Eumenes during the war with Antiochos, but when Eumenes tried to renew his friendship 
with them they rejected his offer.305 Seleukos was able to gain the favour of the Achaians over 
Eumenes. He sent envoys to them in 187, as the most powerful state on mainland Greece, offering 
ten ships and seeking to renew philia; they responded positively and accepted the renewal, but 
according to Polybios politely declined the offer for the ships.306 Diodorus, in turn, records that 
the Achaians accepted the ships, but Polybios’ account that they rejected the ships (only for the 
moment) is more plausible and it was likely that they were trying to distance themselves from 
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military association with Seleukos.307 It was not at all unusual for a king to seek friendship near 
the beginning of his reign.308 
 As already mentioned, Seleukos briefly considered entering Asia Minor to intervene 
against Eumenes and Ariarathes on the side of Pharnakes of Pontus, who made him an offer of 500 
talents for help in the late 180s; Seleukos mobilized but turned back at the Taurus.309 Pharnakes’ 
grandmother was the sister of Seleukos II, Seleukos’ grandfather, and he also married a close 
relative of Seleukos,310 which made him a relative of Seleukos and was perhaps a consideration 
when Seleukos began to march northwards. 
 His perhaps most famous connection to another Hellenistic monarch was that with Perseus 
of Macedon. Perseus himself was vigorously renewing his external relations which had fallen by 
the wayside, and he eventually looked to the Seleukids.311 Seleukos was certainly interested in 
repairing the relationship with Perseus, which had been severed during the war with Rome, and it 
was his most obvious endeavor to enter the Mediterranean political scene.312 In 186, Seleukos 
deviated from the standard practice and named his first-born son Demetrios, making an obvious 
connection to the Antigonids and serving as a reminder of dynastic relations of the past.313 With 
the alleged plan of Seleukos to attack Pergamon, when he marched an army to the Taurus, he may 
have sought to contain Eumenes with an alliance with Perseus; Eumenes had a foothold in Europe 
at Lysimacheia, and the Antigonids were probably upset that they too had sided with the Romans 
but had gotten nothing in return for their help unlike Eumenes or Rhodes.314 
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 Furthermore, to seal the Antigonid alliance, Seleukos gave his daughter Laodike to Perseus 
in marriage. Seleukos commissioned the Rhodian navy to sail her to Macedon since it was better 
for him not to send a fleet into the Aegean, a procession which Gruen says “dramatized the 
recovery of Seleukid international esteem”; the Rhodian sailors were given a gold crown each as 
a gift from Perseus.315 The marriage itself took place in 178 or spring 177.316 Could it be that the 
joining of houses was intended to check Rome’s power? The effect was certainly felt by Rome 
and alarmed Eumenes, who was an irreconcilable enemy of both kings, but Rome did nothing 
Seleukos or the Rhodians other than its later manifestation of its disapproval towards Rhodes for 
transporting Laodike with such a great display of splendor; their relationship declined until after 
the Third Macedonian War when Rome punished Rhodes through economic sanctions and a 
revocation of friendship.317 The marriage itself did not go against anything which Rome had 
demanded, but Seleukos still tried to pacify them preemptively by offering his son Demetrios as a 
replacement hostage for his brother Antiochos; the marriage made Rome suspicious of the three 
major powers in the wedding as perhaps an anti-Roman coalition, though this at the very core 
seems to just be a dynastic marriage of the traditional kind familiar to Hellenistic diplomacy.318 
This not only showed Seleukos’ initiative to collect international allies, but a marriage with the 
Antigonids and the cooperation of Rhodes elevated his status and helped undermine Pergamene 
power.319 
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 The most notable absence from the entirety of Seleukos’ reign is any war, a factor which 
is continually levied against him and his reputation. This too is easily explained not as a result of 
Apameia but because Seleukos simply had no reason to make any. He was certainly a capable 
commander, as is shown in his campaigning for his father in the 190s, so it must have been a 
combination of both not needing to and wanting to keep the kingdom at peace for its recovery and 
consolidation. That it was necessary for Seleukos to go to war is a modern thought: the idea of an 
equilibrium established after the initial establishment of the three main successor kingdoms was 
an invasive idea from early modern scholarship, analogous to 19th century Europe; this assumes 
too that the kingdoms were like modern states with presumed policies and impersonal rulers, while 
Hellenistic kingdoms were more personal states in a world which was chaotic and unstable.320 
Successors took territory from struggle and had then both to retain control and defend it: the idea 
of conquest was still potent depending on the ruler and circumstances, though Seleukos himself 
was content to refrain from undertaking conquest expeditions.321 Kings did more than war, and 
war was not nothing more than an economic activity for kings nor were kings solely dependent on 
military success. Military-political affairs were linked to socio-economic affairs.322 
 Provision of regular pay was a drain on even the wealthiest king, and the main motive for 
any troop was money. This perhaps meant that Seleukos either employed a smaller army to keep 
costs low or had difficulty paying considering any more pressing financial obligations; Seleukos 
had no need for a larger standing army, never recaptured the eastern satrapies which his father 
ruled, and there are no known plans of his for any large-scale military action in the east.323 Thus 
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there is no evidence remaining to show that Seleukos had any interest in fighting with his eastern 
neighbors. To the north Asia Minor was largely the same case: Antiochos III had renounced the 
claim of territory at Apameia and he could not risk angering Rome by transgressing the boundary 
and making war on her allies. This may show that he had no intention of coming to terms with 
Eumenes, who now possessed territory which formerly would have been his.324 The closest 
Seleukos came to war was when he marched to the Taurus with an army to Pharnakes’ aid, and 
the prospect of the Seleukids joining the conflict may in fact have been Rome’s impetus for 
brokering a peace.325 
 Seleukid conflict southward was in a somewhat different position than those to either the 
east or north, as the Ptolemies had their own problems to deal with at this time. Antiochos III had 
already gained control of Koile Syria and Phoenicia and made it a satrapy after Panion in 200 as a 
result of the Fifth Syrian War (202-198).326 Seleukos evidently had no need or desire to open a 
new war with Egypt; because he already possessed the contested territory and had no claim on 
Egypt itself it would have been up to the Ptolemies to renew the conflicts if they wished to regain 
what they had lost.327 The Ptolemies, however, were quite absorbed in controlling their own 
internal issues. Egypt’s situation was worse in the years after 200 than it had been in the past, and 
young Ptolemy V was crowned after the death of his father Ptolemy IV in 204/3. Native revolts 
had plagued Egypt, even in the third century. Revolt in Upper Egypt caused the Ptolemies great 
pains from 207/6 until 186, when Ptolemy V was able to defeat the rebels,328 and a revolt in Lower 
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Egypt was only completely crushed by 184.329 The treaty in 195 which he undertook with 
Antiochos III likely forced him to concede his territories in Asia Minor, and the loss of those 
territories along with Koile Syria and Phoenicia had economic consequences for the Ptolemies.330  
 The second aspect which prevented Ptolemaic invasions of Syria was that Ptolemy V died 
shortly after he finished quelling the rebellions in 180, as reportedly his own generals poisoned 
him fearing that he would take their property to fund a campaign to retake what lands Antiochos 
III had captured.331 As a result Kleopatra, who was the sister of Seleukos, came to the throne of 
Egypt as guardian for her too young son Ptolemy VI and ruled until her death in 176.332 Antiochos 
III had given his daughter Kleopatra to Ptolemy V in marriage in 195 as part of the treaty ending 
the Fifth Syrian War and effectively tied Seleukid interests to Ptolemaic ones, she wed the then 
15-year-old king at Raphia in 194/3 and took the epithet ‘Syra’ to reflect her origins.333 Kleopatra, 
who was immediately friendly towards the Seleukids, put a stop to any war plans and preparations 
against her brother, and likewise there was no reason for Seleukos to resume or undertake any 
hostilities.334 Relations between the kingdoms turned sour sometime after her death, and Antiochos 
IV later used this same relationship with Kleopatra, as the uncle of Ptolemy VI, to invade Egypt.335 
 Like Seleukos’ internal affairs, little remains of the sources speaking to his external affairs 
but still much can be inferred from what does remain. It is clear that Seleukos was not an idle king, 
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content to remain isolated and fortified in Syria, but rather that he was focused on international 
politics and the protection of his kingdom alike. His policy was not one of weakness, but one of 






Chapter VII: The Death of Seleukos and the Results of his Reign  
 Seleukos was murdered on the 2nd or 3rd of September of 175 in circumstances which are 
still not clear, and at the time in his 40s, an average age for a Seleukid king to die; typically, 
Heliodoros is depicted as his assassin.336 Appian reports that Seleukos was poisoned as part of a 
court conspiracy.337 There is not much evidence that Heliodoros was actually responsible for the 
murder, with Appian alone naming him as the head of a conspiracy, however he still appears to be 
the most likely culprit.338  What his motivations may have been are all but speculation, perhaps he 
worried that he would lose prominence with the return of Antiochos (IV) to the Seleukid court 
from Rome, or thought that he could take power by governing in the name of Seleukos’ young son 
Antiochos and claim that he was preserving the dynasty, poised to maintain a semblance of 
legitimacy and continuity through the boy king.339 Appian does not speculate on this either, simply 
claiming that he took up the reins of power.340 It is plausible that he may have been bribed by the 
Ptolemies to destabilize the Seleukids so that Koile Syria could be reconquered.341 Heliodoros’ 
closeness to the king gave him the ability to assassinate him in obscure circumstances.342 If there 
was any part played by Rome or Eumenes in his assassination it is unknown, but not necessarily 
improbable; it may have been that Rome orchestrated the plan or it was a plot with Eumenes to 
ruin the political relations between the Seleukids and the Antigonids, which cleared the way for a 
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Rome-friendly Antiochos IV and misled Heliodoros, if he was the agent of their plan.343 Seleukos’ 
untimely death led directly to external meddling and competition for the Seleukid crown: the quiet 
of the kingdom died when he did.344 
 The question of succession after Seleukos was complicated because he died without a 
selected heir. The Seleukids had a practice of co-regency before sole power was assumed by the 
king up to this point, such as Seleukos had with his father before his death. The hostage 
requirement in Rome effectively interrupted the tradition which identified the designated heir and 
eased succession; Seleukos had as yet been unable to do this.345 After Seleukos’ death there were 
three potential heirs left: his brother Antiochos (IV), his eldest son Demetrios (I), and his youngest 
son Antiochos (Seleukou). The multiplicity of possible heirs set the stage for what Grainger calls 
“Seleukid civil war”.346 Roman willingness to intervene is shown in the next few stages of the 
royal succession, and the “seeds of dynastic weakness” were sown in the aftermath of Antiochos’ 
III’s defeat even further.347 
 In 176 Demetrios had replaced Antiochos IV as a hostage in Rome as a gesture of good 
will by Seleukos. Antiochos had been in that position since the loss at Magnesia for a total of 13 
years at that point. Appian gives the impression that Seleukos chose to send Demetrios, though 
there was no indication of brotherly affection from Seleukos and it was more likely a Roman 
demand.348 The fact that Seleukos gave his eldest son as a hostage may be interpreted as a sign he 
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felt relations with Rome were strained, perhaps as a result of his alliance with Rhodes.349 After 
Seleukos’ death Antiochos left Athens, where he had been staying since leaving Rome, and went 
to Eumenes in Asia Minor, where he was given a diadem and was conducted to Syria by Attalos.350 
The chance that Antiochos would ever come to the throne had been very slim before Seleukos 
died, but Demetrios was now a hostage and Antiochos Seleukou was too young. Antiochos perhaps 
felt that he had the responsibility of claiming the throne from Heliodoros’ strings for the good of 
the dynasty.351 His was a complex coup, he became king through the benefaction of the Attalids 
and easily gained recognition as such from the senate who kept Demetrios in their grasp; he took 
the throne between October 23rd and November 20th of 175.352 
Supported by Athenian diplomacy and funded and armed by the Attalids, he was thus able 
to rule contrary to the line of succession and ally himself with the Attalids thereafter.353 An 
inscription on the ascension of Antiochos IV, which was erected in Pergamon as a gift from 
Athens, honours Eumenes and Attalos for aiding him with goodwill and affection to his ‘ancestral 
kingdom’.354 The gain to Pergamon of having a friendly king on the Syrian throne would have 
been immense, and completely removed the danger of the still formidable Seleukids.355 Rome’s 
role in this affair was to hold back the ‘legitimate’ heir Demetrios. Appian suggests the alliance of 
Eumenes and Antiochos was Roman conceived, as in 175 both were firmly in the Roman camp 
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time. 
351 Mørkholm 1966, 41. 
352 Polyb. 31.12; Josephus AJ 12.234; Will 1982, 256; Mørkholm 1966, 43; Gera 1998, 113: Antiochos was 
supposedly crowned in the same month as Seleukos’ death according to the Babylonian King List (see Sachs and 
Wiseman 1954, 208), but this is unlikely due to the fact that at the time he was not present at the court but was 
still in Athens, and it would have taken some time to arrive in Syria, later is favoured. 
353 Sherwin-White and Kuhrt 1993, 221; Bringmann 2007, 98; Allen 1983, 79; Swain 1944, 79. 
354 OGIS 248; Austin 2006, 208; Burstein 1985, 38. 




and it is also unlikely that Eumenes would have been able to help without Roman approval.356 
Rome was also somewhat wary of Perseus, and with Antiochos IV on the throne as an ally the 
support he may have got from the Seleukids was gone. At that time Perseus also married his 
daughter to Prusias II of Bithynia, possibly looking to create another collective alliance against 
Pergamon.357  
It is possible that Antiochos Seleukou was designated the heir after Demetrios was sent to 
Rome.358 The coinage issued with his mother depicted as his regent show him to be perhaps four 
or five years old around the time of his father’s death.359 When Antiochos IV came to power he 
adopted the young king and made him the co-ruler. There is no evidence that anyone in Syria 
thought of Demetrios as the legitimate successor and although he was the elder son, Antiochos 
Seleukou was recognized in Syria as the heir even before Antiochos IV arrived; Antiochos IV had 
an uneasy claim himself, however, and he used co-rule with the boy to solidify his claim.360 
Demetrios opposed this arrangement but was stuck in Rome, his partisans may have shown 
opposition but they failed if so.361 Antiochos IV murdered Antiochos Seleukou in 170/69 after the 
birth of his own son the future Antiochos V, which shows the extent to which he felt secure against 
Demetrios’ claim.362 
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During his reign Antiochos IV essentially continued the attitude and aims of Seleukos, and 
a drive for consolidation and restoration of Seleukid realms.363 The revival of the Seleukids began 
to decay after Seleukos and Antiochos IV as a result of continuous dynastic strife which was 
ruinous and aimless and gradually undermined the financial and military strength of the late 
Seleukids, making the Seleukid kingdom helpless to defend against foreign enemies or internal 
disintegration such as the creation of the Jewish kingdom.364 This most damaging split left two 
branches of the family fighting for the throne for many years to come. The risks inherent in 
monarchical empires could not be eliminated, as was shown before in the War of the Brothers 
between Seleukos II and Antiochos Hierax and now again in the rivalry of the descendants of 
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claimed to be a bastard son of Antiochos IV, tried to take the throne from Demetrios in 150 and took the epithet 
‘Theopator’ on coins. He was then confronted by Demetrios’ son Demetrios II in 146; in 144 Antiochos VI, Balas’ 




Chapter VIII: Conclusion 
 Seleukos IV inherited a defeated kingdom, and successfully led the Seleukids through less 
than ideal circumstances by his prudent rulership.  Seleukos’ reputation suffered from the 
perception that he did not fit into the paradigm of what then made a ‘good’ Hellenistic king, 
primarily because of his peaceful and militarily non-aggressive reign. In Greek thought, 
monarchical power was associated with great personalities and great achievements: Hellenistic 
kings were usually a part of constant struggle to maintain and gain territories, seldom lacked those 
rivals who would seek to join the ‘royal club,’ and were at a least in part military leaders.366 
Although Seleukos was a capable commander he had no good reason to enter into any conflict, 
and as a result he was unable to fit this particular and limited model of Hellenistic success. 
 For Seleukos the treaty of Apameia was not an effective means of control, and it became a 
piece of international law which itself was irrelevant for his reign since it either became legally 
invalid for Seleukos at the death of Antiochos III or Seleukos chose to ignore it. Immediate effects, 
such as the loss of Asia Minor and the burning of part of the royal fleet at Patara still affected him, 
but he still maintained military forces, elephants, ships, and was not afraid to engage in 
international politics. Where it seems that Seleukos was following the terms of the treaty, for 
instance, is explicable through his own needs or goals, although he cared not for the terms it was 
still prudent not to draw the ire of the Romans by either sailing into the Aegean with a fleet or 
crossing the Taurus to fight against Roman allies.  
                                                          
366 Austin 1986, 457-8: examples of a long history of great achievements and personalities immediately from the 
beginning of the Hellenistic age: Demetrius Poliorketes beat Ptolemy in 306 and he and Antigonos Monophthalmos 
declare themselves kings, or Attalos I bests Antiochos Hierax and the Galatians circa 238/7 and takes the title in 
Pergamon. As war leaders, most fought at the head of an army in the field, which is true except of some of the 
Ptolemies after Ptolemy IV, they wore military regalia,  and described themselves as ‘victorious’ (especially true of 




 Signs point to Seleukos successfully managing his kingdom internally as well, participating 
in many activities one would expect a good ruler to engage in. During his reign he continued to 
mete out civic honours, concern himself with religious matters by building and modifying 
infrastructure surrounding the administration of temples, participate in city foundation, and also to 
help keep the Seleukid economy working under the heavy financial burden of the Roman 
indemnity with consistent sources of income. Although he lost Asia Minor, he still controlled an 
empire in which there was plenty of wealth and trade. 
 Seleukos also was successful in his external policy. Throughout his reign he maintained a 
certain negativity towards Rome and her allies, especially Pergamon, but he also made many 
powerful international friends and allies for himself. It is known that he forged alliances with 
Athens, the Achaeans, and most notably Macedon, but it is also likely that during his peaceful 
twelve year reign that he made many more for which there is no extant evidence today. Seleukos 
had no reason to start any wars, since moving north or westward would draw Roman attention, the 
east was difficult to control, and because he already controlled Koile Syria and Phoenicia it was 
the Ptolemies’ discretion to open a Syrian War against him instead of his against them. 
 The death of Seleukos, who murdered in 175, left the Seleukid Empire with many problems 
which would persist for many years afterwards. His infamous brother Antiochos IV Epiphanes 
took the throne with the help of the Attalids and possibly Rome, a fact which Seleukos’ eldest son 
Demetrios I did not forget. The Seleukid line was split into two rival groups, the descendants of 
Seleukos IV and Antiochos IV, who would trade the kingdom’s control back and forth in bloody 
contest and effectively reduce the power of their house with constant infighting. The troubles with 
the Jewish population of the Empire may have arisen in the latter years of Seleukos’ reign; under 




 Seleukos, in the end, managed to accomplish a lot for being such a ‘lazy’ king. Although 
he by no means had a flashy reign, he did what he had to do in order to keep the Seleukid kingdom 
moving forward and to return it to being an international power. His quiet reign suited the difficult 
years after the defeat by Rome, and he spent his time putting his kingdom back at the center of 
Hellenistic politics. Having presided over such a substantial recovery of the kingdom, he made it 
possible for his successor to capitalize on a resurgence of Seleukid power by successfully leading 
the Seleukid kingdom through a challenging period after harsh defeat.367  
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Appendix A: Seleukos IV Genealogy Chart 
A select genealogical chart of the immediate family of Seleukos IV, including more distant 





                                                          




Appendix B: Select Primary Sources 
B1: Portrayals of Seleukos 
 
Appian Syr. 66 
  
 …καὶ αὐτοῦ περὶ τοῖν παίδοιν προεῖπον ἀμφοῖν βεβασιλευκότοιν, Σελεύκου τε καὶ 
Ἀντιόχου, Σελεύκου μὲν ἔτεσι δώδεκα, ἀπράκτως ἅμα καὶ ἀσθενῶς διὰ τὴν τοῦ πατρὸς 
συμφοράν…367 
 
I have already spoken of his two sons both of whom ascended the throne, Seleukos 
and Antiochos, Seleukos for twelve years, but feebly and without success because of his 
father's misfortune. 
 
Jerome In Danielem 11:20 
 
“Et stabit in loco ejus vilissimus, et indignus decore regio: et in paucis diebus 
conteretur, non in furore, nec in praelio.” Seleucum dicit cognomento Philopatorem filium 
Magni Antiochi, qui nihil dignum Syriae et patris gessit imperio, et absque ullis praeliis 
inglorius periit.369 
 
"And there shall stand up in his place one most vile and unworthy of kingly honor, 
and in a few days he shall be destroyed, not in rage, nor in battle." The reference is to the 
Seleukos surnamed Philopator, the son of Antiochos the Great, who performed no deeds 
worthy of Syria or of his father in his reign, but perished ingloriously without fighting a 
single battle. 
 




ἦν δὲ τοιαύτη τις ἡ τῶν κατὰ μέρος διάταξις: φιλίαν ὑπάρχειν Ἀντιόχῳ καὶ 
Ῥωμαίοις εἰς ἅπαντα τὸν χρόνον ποιοῦντι τὰ κατὰ τὰς συνθήκας. [2] μὴ διιέναι βασιλέα 
Ἀντίοχον καὶ τοὺς ὑποταττομένους διὰ τῆς αὑτῶν χώρας ἐπὶ Ῥωμαίους καὶ τοὺς 
συμμάχους πολεμίους μηδὲ χορηγεῖν αὐτοῖς μηδέν: [3] ὁμοίως δὲ καὶ Ῥωμαίους καὶ τοὺς 
συμμάχους ἐπ᾽ Ἀντίοχον καὶ τοὺς ὑπ᾽ ἐκεῖνον ταττομένους. [4] μὴ πολεμῆσαι δὲ Ἀντίοχον 
τοῖς ἐπὶ ταῖς νήσοις μηδὲ τοῖς κατὰ τὴν Εὐρώπην. [5] ἐκχωρείτω δὲ πόλεων καὶ χώρας * 
[6] **. μὴ ἐξαγέτω μηδὲν πλὴν τῶν ὅπλων ὧν φέρουσιν οἱ στρατιῶται: εἰ δέ τι τυγχάνουσιν 
ἀπενηνεγμένοι, καθιστάτωσαν πάλιν εἰς τὰς αὐτὰς πόλεις. [7] μηδ᾽ ὑποδεχέσθωσαν τοὺς 
ἐκ τῆς Εὐμένους τοῦ βασιλέως μήτε στρατιώτας μήτ᾽ ἄλλον μηδένα. [8] εἰ δέ τινες ἐξ ὧν 
ἀπολαμβάνουσιν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι πόλεων μετὰ δυνάμεώς εἰσιν Ἀντιόχου, τούτους εἰς Ἀπάμειαν 
ἀποκαταστησάτωσαν. [9] τοῖς δὲ Ῥωμαίοις καὶ τοῖς συμμάχοις εἴ τινες εἶεν ἐκ τῆς 
Ἀντιόχου βασιλείας, εἶναι τὴν ἐξουσίαν καὶ μένειν, εἰ βούλονται, καὶ ἀποτρέχειν. [10] τοὺς 
δὲ δούλους Ῥωμαίων καὶ τῶν συμμάχων ἀποδότω Ἀντίοχος καὶ οἱ ὑπ᾽ αὐτὸν ταττόμενοι, 
                                                          





καὶ τοὺς ἁλόντας καὶ τοὺς αὐτομολήσαντας, καὶ εἴ τινα αἰχμάλωτόν ποθεν εἰλήφασιν. [11] 
ἀποδότω δὲ Ἀντίοχος, ἐὰν ᾖ δυνατὸν αὐτῷ, καὶ Ἀννίβαν Ἀμίλκου Καρχηδόνιον καὶ 
Μνασίλοχον Ἀκαρνᾶνα καὶ Θόαντα Αἰτωλόν, καὶ Εὐβουλίδαν καὶ Φίλωνα Χαλκιδεῖς, καὶ 
τῶν Αἰτωλῶν ὅσοι κοινὰς εἰλήφασιν ἀρχάς, [12] καὶ τοὺς ἐλέφαντας τοὺς ἐν Ἀπαμείᾳ 
πάντας, καὶ μηκέτι ἄλλους ἐχέτω. [13] ἀποδότω δὲ καὶ τὰς ναῦς τὰς μακρὰς καὶ τὰ ἐκ 
τούτων ἄρμενα καὶ τὰ σκεύη, καὶ μηκέτι ἐχέτω πλὴν δέκα καταφράκτων: μηδὲ λέμβον 
πλείοσι τριάκοντα κωπῶν ἐχέτω ἐλαυνόμενον, μηδὲ μονήρη πολέμου ἕνεκεν, [14] οὗ 
αὐτὸς κατάρχει. μηδὲ πλείτωσαν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Καλυκάδνου καὶ Σαρπηδονίου ἀκρωτηρίου, 
εἰ μὴ φόρους ἢ πρέσβεις ἢ ὁμήρους ἄγοιεν. [15] μὴ ἐξέστω δὲ Ἀντιόχῳ μηδὲ ξενολογεῖν 
ἐκ τῆς ὑπὸ Ῥωμαίους ταττομένης μηδ᾽ ὑποδέχεσθαι τοὺς φεύγοντας. [16] ὅσαι δὲ οἰκίαι 
Ῥοδίων ἢ τῶν συμμάχων ἦσαν ἐν τῇ ὑπὸ βασιλέα Ἀντίοχον ταττομένῃ ταύτας εἶναι 
Ῥοδίων, ὡς καὶ πρὸ τοῦ τὸν πόλεμον ἐξενεγκεῖν. [17] καὶ εἴ τι χρῆμα ὀφείλετ᾽ αὐτοῖς, 
ὁμοίως ἔστω πράξιμον: καὶ εἴ τι ἀπελήφθη ἀπ᾽ αὐτῶν, ἀναζητηθὲν ἀποδοθήτω. ἀτελῆ δὲ 
ὁμοίως ὡς καὶ πρὸ τοῦ πολέμου τὰ πρὸς τοὺς Ῥοδίους ὑπαρχέτω. εἰ δέ τινας τῶν πόλεων, 
[18] ἃς ἀποδοῦναι δεῖ Ἀντίοχον, ἑτέροις δέδωκεν Ἀντίοχος, ἐξαγέτω καὶ ἐκ τούτων τὰς 
φρουρὰς καὶ τοὺς ἄνδρας. ἐὰν δέ τινες ὕστερον ἀποτρέχειν βούλωνται, μὴ προσδεχέσθω. 
[19] ἀργυρίου δὲ δότω Ἀντίοχος Ἀττικοῦ Ῥωμαίοις ἀρίστου τάλαντα μύρια δισχίλια ἐν 
ἔτεσι δώδεκα, διδοὺς καθ᾽ ἕκαστον ἔτος χίλια: μὴ ἔλαττον δ᾽ ἑλκέτω τὸ τάλαντον λιτρῶν 
Ῥωμαϊκῶν ὀγδοήκοντα: καὶ μοδίους σίτου πεντηκοντακισμυρίους καὶ τετρακισμυρίους. 
[20] δότω δὲ Εὐμένει τῷ βασιλεῖ τάλαντα τριακόσια πεντήκοντα ἐν ἔτεσι τοῖς πρώτοις 
πέντε, ἑβδομήκοντα κατὰ τὸ ἔτος, τῷ ἐπιβαλλομένῳ * καιρῷ, ᾧ καὶ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις 
ἀποδίδωσι, καὶ τοῦ σίτου, [21] καθὼς ἐτίμησεν ὁ βασιλεὺς Ἀντίοχος, τάλαντα ἑκατὸν 
εἴκοσιν ἑπτὰ καὶ δραχμὰς χιλίας διακοσίας ὀκτώ: ἃ συνεχώρησεν Εὐμένης λαβεῖν, γάζαν 
εὐαρεστουμένην ἑαυτῷ. [22] ὁμήρους δὲ εἴκοσι διδότω Ἀντίοχος, δι᾽ ἐτῶν τριῶν ἄλλους 
ἀνταποστέλλων, μὴ νεωτέρους ἐτῶν ὀκτωκαίδεκα μηδὲ πρεσβυτέρους τετταράκοντα 
πέντε. [23] ἐὰν δέ τι διαφωνήσῃ τῶν ἀποδιδομένων χρημάτων, τῷ ἐχομένῳ ἔτει 
ἀποδότωσαν. [24] ἂν δέ τινες τῶν πόλεων ἢ τῶν ἐθνῶν, πρὸς ἃ γέγραπται μὴ πολεμεῖν 
Ἀντίοχον, πρότεροι ἐκφέρωσι πόλεμον, ἐξέστω πολεμεῖν Ἀντιόχῳ. [25] τῶν δὲ ἐθνῶν καὶ 
πόλεων τούτων μὴ ἐχέτω τὴν κυρίαν αὐτὸς μηδ᾽ εἰς φιλίαν προσαγέσθω. [26] περὶ δὲ τῶν 
ἀδικημάτων τῶν πρὸς ἀλλήλους γινομένων εἰς κρίσιν προκαλείσθωσαν. [27] ἐὰν δέ τι 
θέλωσι πρὸς τὰς συνθήκας ἀμφότεροι κοινῷ δόγματι προστεθῆναι ἢ ἀφαιρεθῆναι ἀπ᾽ 
αὐτῶν, ἐξέστω.370 
 
[1] The terms in detail were as follows: "There shall be friendship between 
Antiochos and the Romans for all time if he fulfills the conditions of the treaty: King 
Antiochos and his subjects shall not permit the passage through their territory of any enemy 
marching against the Romans and their allies or furnish such enemy with any supplies: the 
Romans and their allies engage to act likewise towards Antiochos and his subjects: 
Antiochos shall not make war on the inhabitants of the islands or of Europe: [5] he shall 
evacuate all cities, lands, villages, and forts on this side of Taurus as far as the river Halys 
and all between the valley of Taurus and the mountain ridges that descend to Lycaonia: 
from all such places he is to carry away nothing except the arms borne by his soldiers, and 
if anything has been carried away, it is to be restored to the same city: he shall not receive 
                                                          






either soldiers or others from the kingdom of Eumenes: if there be any men in the army of 
Antiochos coming from the cities which the Romans take over, he shall deliver them up at 
Apameia: if there be any from the kingdom of Antiochos dwelling with the Romans and 
their allies, they may remain or depart at their good pleasure: [10] Antiochos and his 
subjects shall give up the slaves of the Romans and of their allies, and any prisoners of war 
they have taken, if there be such: Antiochos shall give up, if it be in his power, Hannibal 
son of Hamilcar, the Carthaginian, Mnasilochus the Acarnanian, Thoas the Aetolian, 
Eubulidas and Philo the Chalcidians, and all Aetolians who have held public office: he 
shall surrender all the elephants now in Apameia and not keep any in future: he shall 
surrender his long ships with their gear and tackle and in future he shall not possess more 
than ten decked ships of war, nor shall he have any galley rowed by more than thirty oars, 
nor a moneres to serve in any war in which he is the aggressor: his ships shall not sail 
beyond the Calycadnus and the Sarpedonian promontory unless conveying tribute, envoys 
or hostages: [15] Antiochos shall not have permission to hire mercenaries from the lands 
under the rule of the Romans, or to receive fugitives: all houses that belonged to the 
Rhodians and their allies in the dominions of Antiochos shall remain their property as they 
were before he made war on them; likewise if any money is owing to them they may exact 
payment, and if anything has been abstracted from them it shall be sought for and returned: 
merchandise meant for Rhodes shall be free from duties as before the war: if any of the 
cities which Antiochos has to give up have been given by him to others, he shall withdraw 
from these also the garrisons and the men in possession of them: and if any cities afterwards 
wish to desert to him, he shall not receive them: Antiochos shall pay to the Romans a 
thousand talents a year for twelve years, the talent not to weigh less than eighty Roman 
pounds, and five hundred and forty thousand modii of corn: [20] he shall pay to King 
Eumenes three hundred and fifty talents in the next five years, paying seventy talents a year 
at the same time that is fixed for his payments to the Romans and in lieu of the corn, as 
Antiochos estimated it one hundred and twenty-seven talents and twelve hundred and eight 
drachmas, the sum Eumenes agreed to accept as a satisfactory payment to his treasury: 
Antiochos shall give twenty hostages, replacing them every three years, not below eighteen 
years of age and not above forty: if any of the money he pays does not correspond to the 
above stipulations, he shall make it good in the following year: [25] if any of the cities or 
peoples against which Antiochos is forbidden by this treaty to make war begin first to make 
war on him, he may make war on such, provided he does not exercise sovereignty over any 
of them or receive them into his alliance: all grievances of both parties are be submitted to 
a lawful tribunal: if both parties desire to add any clauses to this treaty or to remove any 




Ibi ex decem legatorum sententia foedus in haec uerba fere cum Antiocho 
conscriptum est: 'amicitia regi Antiocho cum populo Romano his legibus et condicionibus 
esto: ne quem exercitum, qui cum populo Romano sociisue bellum gesturus erit, rex per 
fines regni sui eorumue, qui sub dicione eius erunt, transire sinito, neu commeatu neu qua 
alia ope iuuato; idem Romani sociique Antiocho et iis, qui sub imperio eius erunt, praestent. 
                                                          





Belli gerendi ius Antiocho ne esto cum iis, qui insulas colunt, neue in Europam transeundi. 
Excedito urbibus agris uicis castellis cis Taurum montem usque ad Halyn amnem, et a ualle 
Tauri usque ad iuga, qua in Lycaoniam uergit. Ne qua <praeter> arma efferto ex iis oppidis 
agris castellisque, quibus excedat; si qua extulit, quo quaeque oportebit, recte restituito. Ne 
militem neu quem alium ex regno Eumenis recipito. Si qui earum urbium ciues, quae regno 
abscedunt, cum rege Antiocho intraque fines regni eius sunt, Apameam omnes ante diem 
certam redeunto; qui ex regno Antiochi apud Romanos sociosque sunt, iis ius abeundi 
manendique esto; seruos seu fugitiuos seu bello captos, seu quis liber captus aut transfuga 
erit, reddito Romanis sociisque. Elephantos tradito omnis neque alios parato. Tradito et 
naues longas armamentaque earum, neu plures quam decem naues <tectas neue plures 
quam naues> actuarias, quarum nulla plus quam triginta remis agatur, habeto, neue 
monerem [ex] belli causa, quod ipse illaturus erit. Ne nauigato citra Calycadnum neu 
Sarpedonium promunturia, extra quam si qua nauis pecuniam <in> stipendium aut legatos 
aut obsides portabit. Milites mercede conducendi ex iis gentibus, quae sub dicione populi 
Romani sunt, Antiocho regi ius ne esto, ne uoluntarios quidem recipiendi. Rhodiorum 
sociorumue quae aedes aedificiaque intra fines regni Antiochi sunt, quo iure ante bellum 
fuerunt, eo Rhodiorum sociorumue sunto; si quae pecuniae debentur, earum exactio esto; 
si quid ablatum est, id conquirendi cognoscendi repetendique item ius esto. Si quas urbes, 
quas tradi oportet, ii tenent, quibus Antiochus dedit, et ex iis praesidia deducito, utique 
recte tradantur, curato. Argenti probi talenta Attica duodecim milia dato intra duodecim 
annos pensionibus aequis—talentum ne minus pondo octoginta Romanis ponderibus 
pendat—et tritici quingenta quadraginta milia modium. Eumeni regi talenta trecenta 
quinquaginta intra quinquennium dato, et pro frumento, quod aestimatione fit, talenta 
centum uiginti septem. Obsides Romanis uiginti dato et triennio mutato, ne minores 
octonum denum annorum neu maiores quinum quadragenum. Si qui sociorum populi 
Romani ultro bellum inferent Antiocho, uim ui arcendi ius esto, dum ne quam urbem aut 
belli iure teneat aut in amicitiam accipiat. Controuersias inter1 se iure ac iudicio 
disceptando, aut, si utrisque placebit, bello.' De Hannibale Poeno et Aetolo Thoante et 
Mnasilocho Acarnane et Chalcidensibus Eubulida et Philone dedendis in hoc quoque 
foedere adscriptum est, et ut, si quid postea addi demi mutariue placuisset, ut id saluo 
foedere fieret.372 
 
Here the treaty as settled by the ten commissioners was drawn up. The substance 
of it was as follows: "There shall be peace and amity between King Antiochos and the 
Roman people on these terms and conditions: The king shall not suffer any army purposing 
to levy war on the Roman people or their allies to pass through the borders of his kingdom 
or of any subject to him, nor shall he assist it with provisions or in any other way whatever. 
The Romans and their allies shall act in like manner towards Antiochos and those under 
his sway. Antiochos shall have no right to levy war upon those who dwell in the islands, 
or to sail across to Europe. He shall withdraw from all the cities, lands, villages and forts 
west of the Taurus as far as the Halys and extending from the lowlands of the Taurus up to 
the range which stretches towards Lycaonia. He shall not carry any arms from the aforesaid 
towns and lands and forts from which he withdraws; if he has carried any away he shall 
duly restore them to whatever place they belong. He shall not reclaim any soldier or any 
other person whatever from the kingdom of Eumenes. If any citizens belonging to the cities 
                                                          




which are passing from under his rule are with Antiochos or within the boundaries of his 
realm, they shall all return to Apameia by a certain day; if any of Antiochos' subjects are 
with the Romans and their allies they shall be at liberty to depart or to remain. He shall 
restore to the Romans and their allies the slaves, whether fugitives or prisoners of war, or 
any free man who has been taken captive or is a deserter. He shall give up his elephants 
and not procure any more. He shall likewise make over his ships of war and all their tackle, 
nor shall he possess more than ten light decked ships, none of which may be propelled by 
more than thirty oars, and no smaller ones for use in any war which he may undertake. He 
shall not take his ships west of the headlands of the Calycadnus or the Sorpedon, save only 
such ships as shall carry money or tribute or envoys or hostages. Antiochos shall not have 
the right to hire mercenary troops from those nations which shall be under the suzerainty 
of Rome nor to accept them even as volunteers. Such houses and buildings as belonged to 
the Rhodians and their allies within the dominions of Antiochos shall be held by them on 
the same right as before the war. If any moneys are due to them they shall have the same 
right to exact them, if aught has been taken from them, they shall have the right of search 
and recovery. Whatever cities amongst those that are to be surrendered they hold as a gift 
from Antiochos; he shall withdraw the garrisons from them and provide for their due 
surrender. He shall pay 12,000 Attic talents of sterling silver in equal instalments over 
twelve years - the talent shall weigh not less than 80 Roman pounds - and 540,000 modii 
of wheat. To King Eumenes he shall pay 350 talents within five years, and in place of corn 
its value in money, 127 talents. He shall give twenty hostages to the Romans and exchange 
them for others in three years, that none may be less than eighteen or more than forty-five 
years of age. If any of the allies of Rome shall wantonly and without provocation make 
war on Antiochos, he shall have the right to repel them by force of arms, always providing 
that he shall not hold any city by right of war or receive it into friendship and amity. 
Disputes shall be determined before a judicial tribunal, or if both parties shall so will it, by 
war." There was an additional clause dealing with the surrender of Hannibal, Thoas and 
Mnasilochus, as well as Eubulidas and Philo of Chalcidaea, and also a proviso that if it 
should afterwards be decided to add to, or repeal, or alter any of the articles, that should be 
done without impairing the validity of the treaty.373 
 
Appian Syr. 38-9 
 
[38]…ὅσα καὶ ἡμῖν ἔσται χρήσιμα καὶ αὐτῷ λυσιτελῆ πρὸς τὸ μέλλον ἐς 
ἀσφάλειαν, ἀπέχεσθαι μὲν αὐτὸν τῆς Εὐρώπης ὅλης καὶ Ἀσίας τῶν ἐπὶ τάδε τοῦ Ταύρου 
῾καὶ τούτοις ὅροι τεθήσονταἰ, παραδοῦναι δ᾽ ἐλέφαντας ὅσους ἔχει καὶ ναῦς ὅσας ἂν 
ἐπιτάξωμεν, ἔς τε λοιπὸν ἐλέφαντας μὲν οὐκ ἔχειν, ναῦς δὲ ὅσας ἂν ὁρίσωμεν, δοῦναι δὲ 
καὶ εἴκοσιν ὅμηρα, ἃ ἂν ὁ στρατηγὸς ἐπιγράψῃ, καὶ χρήματα ἐς τὴν τοῦδε τοῦ πολέμου 
δαπάνην, δι᾽ αὐτὸν γενομένου, τάλαντα Εὐβοϊκὰ αὐτίκα μὲν ἤδη πεντακόσια, καὶ ὅταν 
τάσδε τὰς σπονδὰς ἡ σύγκλητος ἐπιψηφίσῃ, δισχίλια καὶ πεντακόσια, δώδεκα δ᾽ ἔτεσιν 
ἄλλοις ἕτερα μύρια καὶ δισχίλια, τὸ μέρος ἑκάστου ἔτους ἀναφέροντα ἐς Ῥώμην: 
ἀποδοῦναι δ᾽ ἡμῖν αἰχμάλωτα καὶ αὐτόμολα πάντα, καὶ Εὐμένει ὅσα λοιπὰ τῆς πρὸς 
Ἄτταλον τὸν Εὐμένους πατέρα συνθήκης ἔχει. ταῦτα Ἀντιόχῳ πράττοντι ἀδόλως δίδομεν 
εἰρήνην τε καὶ φιλίαν, ὅταν ἡ σύγκλητος ἐπιψηφίσῃ. 
                                                          






[39] τοσάδε προύτεινεν ὁ Σκιπίων, καὶ πάντα ἐδέχοντο οἱ πρέσβεις. το τε μέρος 
αὐτίκα τῶν χρημάτων καὶ τὰ εἴκοσιν ὅμηρα ἐκομίζετο, καὶ ἦν αὐτῶν Ἀντίοχος ο νεώτερος 
υἱὸς Ἀντιόχου. ἐς δὲ τὴν Ῥώμην οἵ τε Σκιπίωνες καὶ ὁ Ἀντίοχος πρέσβεις ἔπεμπον, καὶ ἡ 
βουλὴ τοῖς ἐγνωσμένοις συνετίθεντο. καὶ ἐγράφοντο συνθῆκαι τοὺς Σκιπίωνος λόγους 
βεβαιοῦσαί τε καὶ περὶ τῶν ἀορίστων ἐπιλέγουσαι, καὶ βραχέα ἄττα προσεπιλαμβάνουσαι, 
ὅρον μὲν Ἀντιόχῳ τῆς ἀρχῆς εἶναι δύο ἄκρας, Καλύκαδνόν τε καὶ Σαρπηδόνιον, καὶ τάσδε 
μὴ παραπλεῖν Ἀντίοχον ἐπὶ πολέμῳ, ναῦς δὲ καταφράκτους ἔχειν δώδεκα μόνας, αἷς ἐς 
τοὺς ὑπηκόους πολέμου κατάρχειν: πολεμούμενον δὲ καὶ πλέοσι χρῆσθαι: μηδένα δ᾽ ἐκ 
τῆς Ῥωμαίων ξενολογεῖν, μηδὲ φυγάδας ἐξ αὐτῆς ὑποδέχεσθαι, καὶ τὰ ὅμηρα διὰ τριετίας 
ἐναλλάσσειν, χωρίς γε τοῦ παιδὸς Ἀντιόχου. ταῦτα συγγραψάμενοί τε καὶ ἐς τὸ 
Καπιτώλιον ἐς δέλτους χαλκᾶς ἀναθέντες, οὗ καὶ τὰς ἄλλας συνθήκας ἀνατιθέασιν, 
ἔπεμπον ἀντίγραφα Μαλλίῳ Οὐούλσωνι τῷ διαδεδεγμένῳ τὴν Σκιπίωνος στρατηγίαν.374 
 
 [38] …He must abandon Europe altogether and all of Asia this side of the Taurus, 
the boundaries to be fixed hereafter; he shall surrender all the elephants he has, and such 
number of ships as we may prescribe, and for the future keep no elephants and only so 
many ships as we allow; must give twenty hostages, whom the consul will select, and pay 
for the cost of the present war, incurred on his account, 500 Euboic talents down and 2500 
more when the Senate ratifies the treaty; and 12,000 more during twelve years, each yearly 
installment to be delivered in Rome. He shall also surrender to us all prisoners and 
deserters, and to Eumenes whatever remains of the possessions he acquired by his 
agreement with Attalus, the father of Eumenes. If Antiochos accepts these conditions 
without guile we will grant him peace and friendship subject to the Senate's ratification." 
 
[39] All the terms offered by Scipio were accepted by the ambassadors. That part 
of the money which was to be paid down, and the twenty hostages, were furnished. Among 
the latter was Antiochos, the younger son of Antiochos. The Scipios and Antiochos both 
sent messengers to Rome. The Senate ratified their acts, and a treaty was written carrying 
out Scipio's views, a few things being added or made plain that had been left indefinite. 
The boundaries of the dominions of Antiochos were to be the two promontories of 
Calycadnus and Sarpedonium, beyond which he should not sail for purposes of war. He 
should have only twelve war-ships for the purpose of keeping his subjects under control, 
but he might have more if he were attacked. He should not recruit mercenaries from Roman 
territory nor entertain fugitives from the same, and the hostages should be changed every 
third year, except the son of Antiochos. This treaty was engraved on brazen tablets and 
deposited in the Capitol (where it was customary to deposit such treaties), and a copy of it 
was sent to Manlius Vulso, Scipio's successor in the command.375 
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